The Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Informal Labor Markets.� by Paz, Lourenco
The Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Informal Labor Markets:
A Theoretical and Empirical Evaluation of the Brazilian Case.∗
Lourenc¸o S. Paz
Department of Economics
110 Eggers Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244 USA
Phone: 1(315)443-5874, Fax: 1(315)443-3717
lspaz@maxwell.syr.edu
Abstract
Following trade liberalization, several developing countries experienced a sharp increase in
the share of informal manufacturing employment. In this paper, I examine the impacts of trade
liberalization on the labor markets of a small open economy, in an environment in which tariffs
affect firms’ payroll tax compliance decisions. I demonstrate that a reduction in domestic import
tariffs reduces the average formal wage and show that the direction of the effect on the share of
informal employment depends on the initial labor market conditions. A cut in trading partner
import tariffs decreases the share of domestic informal employment and increases the average
formal wage. I confirm the model’s principal findings empirically, using data from the 1989–2001
Brazilian trade liberalization episode. I find the results robust to endogeneity and self-selection
concerns, which are addressed, respectively, using instrumental variable and switching regression
approaches.
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1 Introduction
The coexistence of formal jobs with informal ones that do not meet basic legal requirements not
only is a common worldwide phenomenon but an increasingly important one (see, for example,
Schneider and Enste, 2000). Indeed, in many developing countries, a substantive share of the
workforce is employed informally—for instance, in Brazil, China, and Colombia in excess of 30% of
all employment can be classified as informal.1 For Brazil and Argentina, Neri (2001) and Pratap and
Quintin (2006) provide empirical evidence that suggests the principal economic distinction between
formal and informal jobs centers on firms’ payroll tax compliance decisions. Thus, although most
employers comply with myriad other labor market regulations, there is a sharp divide between
those that do and those that do not pay payroll taxes.
Given the demarcation just described between the two job types, the extent of informal em-
ployment clearly has important ramifications for total government tax revenues. Indeed, Rodrik
(1992) suggests that trade policy-government revenue channel is a key determinant of whether a
country subsequently engages in trade liberalization. Hence, the potentially potent effects of a
country’s choice of trade policy instruments on its domestic formal and informal labor markets can
magnify the relevance of Rodrik’s (1992) remark. Furthermore, many observers regard informal
employment as synonymous with inferior employment—see, for example the recent World Trade
Organization-International Labour Organization report (Bacchetta, Ernst, and Bustamante, 2009).
These latter concerns even have shaped the form of recent trade agreements reached by the United
States with its Latin American trading partners, since many of them now require the counterparty
to follow provisions concerning labor regulations and their enforcement.2
In view of the remarks just made, it is of considerable interest and potentially of great concern
for policy makers that a recent and growing body of evidence points to the fact that trade liberal-
ization episodes (in particular, those carried out by the economies of Latin America) are associated
with a substantial increase in the share of informal workers employed in the manufacturing sector—
see Perry et al. (2007). This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1 for Brazil. Notice that in the
1As found by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) for Brazil and Colombia, and by Mao, Zhang, and Zhao (2012) for
urban China.
2In particular, the 2006 United States trade agreement with Peru includes strengthening and broadening labor
inspectors’ powers and increases the level of fines (see Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2007).
Similarly, the 2006 United States trade agreement with Colombia featured the creation of a Labor ministry and a
substantial increase in the number of labor inspectors (see Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2011).
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aftermath of the trade liberalization process, which began in 1990, the share of informal workers
employed in the Brazilian manufacturing sector increased from 12% to 20.4%. Most important,
notice too that, over the same period, the share of informal workers employed in the service sector
remained stable. Another significant empirical feature associated with each of these trade liber-
alization episodes—as documented by Hanson and Harrison (1999) for Mexico and by Pavcnik et
al. (2004) for Brazil—is the absence of any substantive change in the employment shares in the
manufacturing industries. In view of these findings, it follows that, in response to trade shocks,
intraindustry changes in the share of informal employment (hereafter, the informality share) might
constitute a potent labor adjustment margin and so warrant careful investigation.
This latter observation motivates this paper. In it, I construct a theoretical model that is
designed to capture the impact of trade policy changes in a country’s formal and informal labor
markets. More specifically, I consider an environment with heterogeneous firms, in which each
firm’s optimal payroll tax compliance decisions (and so its formal-informal employment choices)
are endogenous. To explore the ramifications of changes in the trade environment on the informality
share, I embed this payroll tax compliance decision in a small open economy (SOE) version of Davis
and Harrigan’s (2011) Good Jobs, Bad Jobs framework. The model then is implemented empirically
using data from the 1989–2001 Brazilian trade liberalization.
The principal goals of the theoretical model are to uncover the effects of changes in import
tariffs—domestic and those of the country’s trading partners—on the equilibrium levels of the
industry-level share of informal employment, the average formal wage, and the average informal
wage. In contrast to the previous studies, a notable feature of my SOE general equilibrium frame-
work is that it is rich enough to allow for countries of different sizes and to encompass both
differential timing and magnitudes of policy changes. I find that a decrease in domestic import
tariffs lowers the average formal wage but has a (genuine) ambiguous effect on the employment
share of informal workers. More specifically, I show that the predicted sign of the domestic tariff-
informality employment share nexus hinges on the initial (i.e., pre-reform) labor market conditions.
A reduction in the country’s trading partner’s import tariffs decreases the informality share but
increases the average formal wage; however, I show that the effect on the average informal wage is
ambiguous.
As discussed later, the available empirical evidence concerning the magnitude and direction of
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the effect of changes in the trade environment on informal employment is far from conclusive. In
this light, my paper further contributes to this important and growing body of literature not only by
providing new estimates but also by introducing several important methodological improvements.
First, consonant with Almeida and Carneiro’s (2012) recent findings, I show that the enforcement of
labor regulations is a key determinant of the extent of informal employment. The extant literature,
however, has largely failed to address this important concern. In this paper, I take steps to address it
by carefully controlling for spatial and temporal heterogeneity in enforcement efforts. Furthermore,
I instrument for Brazilian import tariffs to address possible simultaneity concerns regarding the
joint determination of import tariff levels and payroll tax enforcement efforts. Finally, to obtain
consistent estimates of the trade policy effects on the average levels of formal and informal wages,
I employ a switching regressions technique. This helps overcome a ubiquitous problem in the
literature of failing to control the simultaneous determination of wages and formality employment
status, thereby addressing the issue of worker self-selection between formal and informal work.
I evaluate the model’s testable predictions using Brazilian data, which have several noteworthy
merits. First, the definition of labor informality used in the theoretical model is directly observable
in Brazilian household surveys, since they include a specific question concerning employer payroll
tax compliance. This potentially represents a significant improvement in the literature, which has
been hampered by the lack of a uniform definition of labor informality. As a result, it has been
difficult not only to link the theory seamlessly with the empirics but also to draw robust comparisons
across different studies. Second, Brazil experienced economically significant changes in its trade
environment. Specifically, as a result of the changes in trade policies that occurred during the 1990s,
Brazil and its trading partners witnessed sharp decreases in their import tariffs. The changes in
the trade environment led to changes in Brazilian import and export levels in excess of 60%. Third,
Brazil’s labor institutions and its labor market regulations remained stable throughout this period
of trade liberalization. This is helpful in identifying the trade-environment–labor-market nexus,
which is the central concern of this paper. In contrast, several other countries, including Chile,
implemented substantial labor market reforms over the same period they were engaging in trade
liberalization.
My empirical results provide evidence that the effects of a reduction in import tariffs by Brazil’s
principal trade partners are to raise the Brazilian industry-level average formal wage and decrease
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the share of informal employment. Alternatively, a reduction in Brazilian import tariffs has precisely
the opposite effect. This former result is potentially of considerable policy importance because it
suggests increased access to large markets, such as the United States, offers a potent market-based
remedy for improving labor conditions in developing countries. For the average informal wage, the
empirical results are often not statistically significant and coefficients switch signs depending on
which identification strategy is used. In addition, I show the magnitudes of the tariff effects on
the average formal and average informal wage is inversely related to the likelihood of the worker
having an informal job. Thus, although multilateral trade liberalization may reduce informality
and increase the average formal wage, the empirical results suggest that the benefits arising from
trade liberalization differ according to the workers characteristics. My paper findings still hold after
several robustness checks, including a falsification test designed to test whether pre-existing trends
in the data are driving the results.
This paper is related to a growing body of work that examines the nexus between the share
of informal employment and changes in the international trade environment. For example, Acosta
and Montes-Rojas (2010) conduct an empirical investigation using Argentinean data, and find
that a decrease in domestic tariffs substantially increases the industry-level informality share in
manufacturing. Alema´n-Castilla (2006) find a decline in U.S. tariffs reduces the informality share
in the Mexican tradable sector, but a decrease in Mexican import tariffs has no effect on informality.
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), who use Brazilian and Colombian data, find that a decrease in import
tariffs slightly increased the informality share in Colombia but had no effect in Brazil. Menezes-
Filho and Muendler (2011), who also use Brazilian data, examine the effect of import tariffs on the
likelihood a worker will switch form formal manufacturing employment to informal work. Their
principal finding, however, is that tariffs have no effect on this transition probability. Bosch, Goni,
and Maloney (2007) also investigate the behavior of labor informality in Brazil; however, they find
that changes in the international trade regime have little effect on the changes in the informality
share observed over the period.
Clearly, the results of the extant literature are mixed. Nevertheless, using the theoretical model
developed in this paper it becomes possible to rationalize some of these disparities. Moreover, as
we shall see, the methodological concerns raised in this paper also can help to explain the source of
the mixed results found in the literature for Brazilian data. This is so because one of my empirical
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specifications that do not include any of my methodological improvements finds results that are in
line with the mixed results provided in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the salient stylized facts
concerning informality and introduce the theoretical model and its testable predictions. In section
3, I discuss the empirical specifications to be estimated. The data used is described in section 4.
Section 5 presents the empirical results and several robustness checks. I offer some conclusions in
section 6.
2 Informality Stylized Facts and Theoretical Model
This section begins with a brief presentation of stylized facts concerning the informal labor markets
that comprise the building blocks of my theoretical model. Next, my theoretical model and its
testable predictions are described and discussed vis-a`-vis the existing literature.
2.1 Informality Stylized Facts and Modeling Strategy
A large strand of the literature defines informality as being based solely on compliance with regu-
lations.3 For example, Schneider and Enste (2000, p. 79) define the informal economy as the “legal
value-added creating activities which are not taxed or registered and where the largest part can be
classified as clandestine labor, which means that unpaid or ‘pure’ household production, voluntary
nonprofit (social) services and criminal activities are excluded.” According to Portes et al. (1989,
p.30), “the best-known economic effect of the informalization process is to reduce the costs of la-
bor substantially.” Among these labor costs, the payroll tax is the largest component, typically
accounting for 15 to 30% of the wage. Furthermore, whether firms comply with the payroll tax is
arguably the root distinction between formal and informal jobs in Argentina (Pratap and Quintin,
2006) and Brazil (Neri, 2002). Thus, I define an informal job as an employment relationship in
which the employer does not comply with the payroll tax.4 Using this definition of informality, I
present four important stylized facts.
3In contrast, the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2001) defines informal jobs as those offered by firms with
five or less workers regardless of compliance with labor regulations.
4This tax compliance characterization of informality is also present in the Public Finance literature, see Keen
(2008) and Davies and Paz (2011), among others.
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Fact 1: Informality is pervasive across manufacturing industries.
As displayed in Table 1, informality is present with different intensities in every manufacturing
industry in Brazil. Moreover, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) found similar results for Colombia, and
Alema´n-Castilla (2006) for Mexico. This means that informality is not an industry-specific phe-
nomenon, and in particular we can see that the informality share increased in every manufacturing
industry.
Fact 2: Most of the informal share variation occurred within manufacturing industries.
I find that 85% of the informality share variation is within manufacturing industries during
the 1989–2001 Brazilian trade liberalization. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) find that almost all
variation in informality during trade liberalization in Colombia is also within-industry. So, the
increase in informality in the manufacturing sector is not driven by between industry changes, as
would happen in a Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin framework.
Fact 3: Small firms are more likely to hire informal workers.
Pratap and Quintin (2006) find for Argentina that informal jobs are more prominent among
firms employing few workers. Neri (2002) finds similar results for Brazil. Although informal work-
ers are more likely to be found in small establishments in Brazil, Table 2 demonstrates that some
small establishments utilize formal workers. Additionally, we find that larger establishments are
more likely to employ formal workers. According to Ellery and Gomes (2007), large establishments
are also responsible for almost all Brazilian manufacturing exports. This suggests that informal
workers are not used for producing exported goods.
Fact 4: Trade liberalization leads to labor reallocation across firms of different sizes.
McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) using Vietnam household rotating-panel data find evidence that
trade liberalization (both unilateral and multilateral) leads to a reallocation of labor from small
to large firms. This means that trade policies affect firms differently according to their size, in
particular small firms become smaller and large firms get larger.
In the literature, the first and second stylized facts are consistent with two modeling strate-
gies. The first is a representative firm that employs people by offering formal and informal labor
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contracts, such as the model constructed by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). The second is a model
of within-industry firm heterogeneity, in which some firms hire formal workers while others hire
informal workers, as in Alema´n-Castilla (2006). However, the representative firm framework can-
not accommodate the third and fourth stylized facts. Both of which suggest that trade-induced
reallocation of employment across firms of different sizes would lead to within-industry changes in
the share of informal workers because firms of different sizes differ in their propensity to employ in-
formal workers. Nonetheless, the class of heterogeneous firm models a` la Melitz (2003) can generate
these four stylized facts, as I explain next.
In my model, firms will choose whether to comply or not with payroll taxes depending on their
expected profits, because tax evasion leads to a fine if caught. Following the Davis and Harrigan
(2011) framework, firms are heterogeneous in their productivity and wages paid, thus there exist
firms that have the same level of productivity yet pay different wages.5 This is crucial to generate
the third stylized fact in which some small firms hire formal workers.
2.2 The Theoretical Model
I first describe the basic environment of my theoretical model. Next, I lay out the workers prefer-
ences and the firms’ technology. Then, I define the two labor contracts available in the economy:
formal and informal. Accordingly, the heterogeneous firms’ profit maximization problem can now
be formulated, which provides the choices of labor contract offered and markets served. By solving
for the general equilibrium, I am able to partition the firms according to their optimal choices of
labor contracts and markets served. Finally, I conduct comparative statics to obtain predictions
regarding the effect of trade policies on the share of informal workers and average formal and
informal wages, which will be assessed empirically in the next section.
The world economy consists of two countries: Home (also called the domestic economy) and For-
eign (indicated by “*”). Each country has a one-sector economy, where firms produce horizontally-
differentiated goods. Home is a small open economy (SOE) in the sense of Demidova and Rodriguez-
5The Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firm model has other extensions that allow for heterogeneous wages. Among
them, Amiti and Davis (2012), Kreickemeier and Egger (2009), Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008), and Helpman
and Itskhoki (2010) feature wages that are proportional to firm size; however, if the payroll tax mechanism proposed
here is applied to these models, all small firms will hire only informal workers, which is not supported by the findings
discussed earlier. One shortcoming of the Davis and Harrigan (2011) model is that the firm-specific wage does not
vary with the firm’s profits. This is contrary to the findings for Indonesia by Amiti and Davis (2012).
8
Clare (2011) and Davies and Paz (2011). That is, domestic policies only affect Foreign via the trade
flow between the two countries. This assumption is justified on the grounds that a typical devel-
oping country has a small impact on aggregate international trade flows.
Preferences and Demands
Workers are risk-neutral and have identical standard Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) preferences that are defined over a continuum of horizontally-differentiated goods, indexed
by ω ∈ Ω. There are no unemployment benefits, and each worker’s income sources are wages and
governmental lump-sum transfers (tr). The latter is taken as given by the workers. Although
workers inelastically supply their homogeneous labor, they each choose a level of effort (e). The
indirect utility of a worker (Vi) employed at firm i that pays a wage Wi and faces a price index P
is
Vi(Wi, e, P, tr) =


(Wi + tr)P
−1 if worker shirks
(Wi/e+ tr)P
−1 if worker exerts effort
trP−1 if worker is unemployed
(1)
The demand for each variety ω, denoted by q(ω), is derived from the consumer expenditure
minimization problem and is q(ω) = p(ω)−σP σQ, where p(ω) is the price of variety ω paid by the
Home consumer, Q is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate consumption level of the economy, and σ is the
elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Firms’ Technology
Each firm produces a single different variety of the horizontally differentiated good using labor as
the only factor of production. Firms are risk-neutral and heterogeneous both in their productivities
(ϕi, ϕi ≥ 1) and monitoring abilities (mi, mi ∈ (0, m¯] where m¯ is the maximum monitoring ability).
The monitoring ability or, equivalently, the employer’s ability to detect a worker that is shirking
her duties generates wage heterogeneity through efficiency wages paid to motivate workers to exert
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effort.6 Notice that such wage heterogeneity is not related to firm size or workers’ characteristics.7
A worker can lose her job because of exogenous firm death (at a rate δ) or after being appre-
hended shirking her duties. Accordingly, the lack of perfect monitoring ability induces firms to pay
an efficiency wage to prevent workers from shirking. The solution to this efficiency wage problem is
similar to the derivation in Davis and Harrigan (2011).8 Let W1 denote the efficiency wage paid by
the domestic firm with the greatest monitoring ability. Consequently, given the inverse monitoring-
wage nexus, W1 is the lowest efficiency wage paid. The wages associated with the other monitoring
ability levels are proportional to W1 and given by a monotonically decreasing relationship between
Wi and mi, which is described in equation (2).
Wi =W1
memi
mi − δ(e− 1)
(2)
Notice that equation (2) implies that ∂Wi/∂mi < 0. It also allows firms to be fully characterized
by the joint distribution of productivity and wages, Ψ(ϕ,W ).
I assume that upon entry, a firm has to pay a one-time fixed entry cost of fe units of labor
to discover its productivity-monitoring ability (or wage) draw. On the basis of this information,
the firm then decides whether or not to operate and if so, which markets to serve. To supply the
domestic market, firms incur a per-period fixed cost of f units of labor and a labor requirement of
ϕ−1i per unit produced (also called the variable-cost activity). To serve the Foreign market, firms
have to pay a per-period fixed export cost of fx units of labor, and the Foreign country import
tariff, which is modeled as an iceberg transportation cost, so that a domestic firm ships τ∗ units
and the Foreign consumer receives one unit, Foreign import tariff ≡ τ∗ − 1 > 0. Hence, the labor
requirement for each unit exported is τ∗ϕ−1i . In order to generate the fact that not all domestic
6According to Dasgupta and Ray (1986) and Ray (1998), efficiency wages in developing countries are motivated
by the fact that a worker’s physical strength (provided and determined by her nourishment) affects her effort level,
so different monitoring abilities could be interpreted as different effort requirements. The effort level is also called
‘labor power’, and can include mental strength. Hence, a higher wage implies better nourishment, which means the
worker is able to exert more effort.
7Schmidt and Zimmermann’s (1991) findings corroborate the existence of wage heterogeneity even after controlling
for firm size and worker characteristics. Using a panel of French firms and workers, Abowd et al. (1999) found that
most of the heterogeneity in inter-industry wages is due to worker fixed effects and not firm effects. Krishna et
al. (2011) also found that, for Brazil, worker innate ability and the quality of the worker-firm match explain most
of within-industry wage variation. Nevertheless, Frias et al. (2009), using a different identification strategy, found
that even after accounting for worker innate ability and match quality, there was still a relevant amount of wage
heterogeneity. In sum, there is still variation that could not be explained. See Schank et al. (2007) for a survey on
matched employer-employee data papers.
8The complete derivation of the efficiency wage problem is presented in the Appendix A.1.
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firms choose to export, I follow Melitz (2003, p. 1709) and assume that fxτ
∗σ−1 > f . Following
Davis and Harrigan (2011), workers who are engaged in fixed-cost activities (fe, f , and fx) receive
a wage of W1, and those performing variable-cost activity earn the efficiency wage, Wi.
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The profit (πi,d) of a firm serving the domestic market is given by equation (3), where bi is
the cost of the labor employed in the variable-cost activity. Such labor cost depends on the firm’s
choice of labor contracts, which will be discussed shortly.
πi,d = pi,dqi,d −W1f − bi
qi,d
ϕi
(3)
The Foreign demand for a Home-produced variety is given by qi,x = p
−σ
i,xA, where A ≡ Q
∗P ∗−σ.
The SOE assumption makes A constant. If a firm decides to export, its profit from exporting is:
πi,x = pi,xqi,x −W1f − τ
∗bi
qi,x
ϕi
(4)
Labor Contracts
I assume that firms can hire workers who perform the variable-cost activity by using either formal
or informal labor contracts. Under a formal contract, the firm complies with payroll taxes. In
particular, it pays an ad valorem payroll tax (t) and a per-worker administrative cost (Θ), which
encompasses the costs of calculating, preparing, and maintaining tax records.10 The per-worker
administrative cost consists of θ units of labor that also receive wage W1 with no payroll tax
incidence, like the labor used in the fixed-cost activities. Thus, the cost of a formal worker for firm
i is bfori = TWi + Θ, where T ≡ 1 + t. Alternatively, the firm may choose not to comply with
payroll taxes, i.e., use an informal labor contract. Yet, every firm is audited with probability ζ,
and if a firm is caught employing informal workers, it has to pay an ad valorem fine η (η > t) that
is based on the wage paid to each informal worker.11 Hence, firm i’s expected cost of an informal
worker is binfi = λWi, where λ ≡ 1 + ηζ.
12
The likelihood of a payroll tax audit depends on the government’s ability to detect the existence
9Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) also abstracted from wage distortions in the fixed costs activities. The assumption
that every firm faces the same fixed costs ensures the existence of general equilibrium in the model.
10Evans (2003) provides evidence about the large private costs of tax compliance. Boisvert et al. (2001) found that
in the case of Brazil, the cost of preparing tax records can be substantial, ranging from 43 to 86 dollars per worker,
or between 15 and 30% of the prevailing minimum monthly wage.
11The formula used here to compute the fine is the one used in Brazil, as required by Laws 8212 and 9876.
12Schneider and Enste (2000) provide an in-depth discussion of the factors influencing regulation compliance.
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of firms. A firm that serves only the domestic market has to be found by government auditors, so
the audit likelihood is ζ = ζ¯ < 1. On the other hand, an exporting firm can be detected easily
because the government monitors borders, and the trade flow information can then be matched to
payroll tax data uncovering any evasion. This rules out the possibility that an exporter employs
formal workers for export orders and informal workers for domestic orders.13 Another possibility
is that firms exposed to international markets may have to follow a different set of rules enforced
by Foreign or by international organizations, e.g., Fair Trade certification.14 Thus, exporters are
more likely to be audited, and for the sake of simplicity, I assume that ζ = 1.
Because my interest is to study an economy in which both formal and informal jobs coexist in the
same industry, I further assume that η− t > θ > ηζ − t > 0. The first inequality, η− t > θ, ensures
that informal workers are more expensive than formal workers whenever ζ = 1. So, exporting firms
always hire formal workers. The second inequality, θ > ηζ − t > 0, guarantees the existence of a
non-empty interval of wages in which the expected cost of an informal worker is smaller than the
expected cost of a formal worker for a non-exporting firm. Since all large firms are exporters in my
model, another interpretation of this assumption is that large firms are more likely to be audited,
which is also in line with the third stylized fact.15
Figure 2 shows the expected cost of a formal and an informal worker for a firm that serves only
the domestic market and for an exporting firm. A formal worker is cheaper than an informal worker
for a non-exporting firm i if its respective wage is Wi > χ ≡ Θ/(λ − T ). Notice that the wage
cutoff (χ) is decreasing in η and ζ, which means that either an increase in the fine or an increase
in the likelihood of an audit will decrease the cutoff. Conversely, an increase in either the payroll
tax or the administrative cost leads to an increase in the cutoff. These properties are consistent
with findings that both taxation and its enforcement are determinants of the informal economy (cf.
Schneider and Enste, 2000).
The payroll tax revenues and fines collected are returned via lump-sum transfer (tr) to all
unemployed and employed (formal and informal) workers. In my model, the formal workers receive
no benefit from the payroll taxes. This means that workers are ex ante indifferent between formal
13Munk (2008) discusses the administrative cost of several types of taxes and suggests that border tariffs are both
the easiest to implement and the cheapest in terms of administrative and monitoring costs.
14See Alm et al. (1992) for a survey on other than pecuniary reasons for tax compliance.
15It seems reasonable that the audit probability should increase with firm size; however, this case is not analytically
tractable, and the results would not be qualitatively different.
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and informal jobs, and in equilibrium, it is up to the firm to decide whether to offer formal or
informal jobs. This feature is also present in the models of Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and
Alema´n-Castilla (2006).
The workers’ indifference between formal and informal jobs can be justified on two fronts. First,
in many developing countries, social security is a pay-as-you-go system, in which workers tend to
see their contributions as simply a tax because the benefits they receive are weakly related to the
contributions they make (for evidence supporting this point, see Kugler and Kugler, 2009; and
Kumler et al., 2012). Furthermore, it is not clear that workers actually benefit from social security,
since the rate of return on social security contributions may be smaller than the return on risk-free
assets. Moreover, the frequent changes in rules end up discrediting the system and making workers
less willing to contribute. Second, suppose that workers actually have some sort of non-pecuniary
benefit from a formal labor contract. Gruber (1997) and Kugler and Kugler (2009) present evidence
that the cost of such benefits could have been passed down to workers in the form of lower wages.
They find that this type of pass-through is very large, sometimes reaching 100%, making workers
indifferent between receiving no benefits and receiving benefits that they have to pay for.16
So far, my model differs from Alema´n-Castilla’s (2006) in two important ways. Notice that
Alema´n-Castilla (2006) considers a Melitz type of model with payroll taxes. In his model, firms
choose whether to comply with taxes and enjoy a larger productivity, or evade taxes and keep
their initial productivity level draw. Although the argument that payroll tax compliance allows
firms access to cheaper sources of capital is appealing, even large firms in developing countries are
credit-constrained, so this does not seem to be a relevant mechanism. Furthermore, in his model,
all small firms hire informal workers. And this result is not supported by the stylized facts discussed
earlier.
In my model, firms exhibit the same productivity regardless of their choice of labor contract.
Second, the wage heterogeneity in my model allows for some small firms to hire formal workers,
and as we will see in the comparative statics of my model, such distinction plays a crucial role in
the determination of the effects of trade policies on informality. Notice that the wage heterogeneity
also leads to predictions involving the average formal and informal wages, as will be soon discussed.
16See Kugler (2011) for a survey on this topic.
13
General Equilibrium
To characterize the general equilibrium of the model, the first step is to lay out the firm optimal labor
contract decision, in order to define the marginal cost-based cutoffs used to classify firms according
to the markets served and type of labor contract used. Like in Melitz (2003), these cutoffs are used
in the derivation of the free entry, the zero profit, and the labor market clearing conditions. Last,
I derive the remaining equilibrium conditions, including the trade balance condition that is now
required due to the SOE assumption, as in Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011).
Given that firms are risk-neutral, they choose whether or not to comply with payroll tax regu-
lations based on their expected profits. Consequently, firms must choose between staying out of the
market due to negative profits, producing only for domestic consumers using informal workers, pro-
ducing only for domestic consumers using formal workers, or producing for domestic and foreign con-
sumers using formal workers. Firm i’s ex post profit is given by πi = max
{
0, πinfi,d , π
for
i,d , π
for
i,d + π
for
x,d
}
Let si be the inverse of firm i’s marginal cost, si(Wi, ϕi) ≡ ϕi/bi. The entry cutoff (sopen) is
defined as the inverse of the marginal cost at which firms make zero profit. This means that firms
with si < sopen do not operate. Similarly, the inverse of the marginal cost at which firms make
zero profit from exporting is defined as sx,for ≡ inf
{
si : π
for
i,d + π
for
x,d > max
[
πinfi,d , π
for
i,d
]}
, which
takes into account not only the export decision of firms employing formal workers but also the
export decision of firms employing informal workers that have to switch to formal workers in order
to supply foreign markets.
Figure 3 shows the entry cutoffs in the wage-productivity space. The diagonal lines represent s,
and their slopes are the marginal cost (b/ϕ); therefore, the flatter the line, the lower the marginal
cost and the higher the employment level. The active firms are on the right-hand side of the sopen
curve, and the firms on the left-hand side choose to stay out of the market as soon as they learn their
productivity and monitoring ability draws. The exporting firms are located on the right-hand side
of sx,for. This implies that exporters will be large firms. The firms that employ informal workers
are located inside the polygon ABCD.17 This means that firms serving the domestic market, with
s between sopen and sx,for, will hire either formal or informal workers depending on the wage
paid. So, not all small firms will hire informal workers, as indicated by the stylized facts discussed
17Because the difference between the informal and formal wage bills decreases in Wi for Wi < χ, the segment AB
belongs to the line TWi +Θ = ϕi/sx,for.
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previously.
Let G(s) ≡ Pr[S ≤ s] be the cumulative distribution function of s, with its density given by
g(s). Following Melitz (2003), the σ − 1 uncentered moment of g(s) is assumed to be finite; and
for the sake of integrability, I assume that σ > 3. This latter assumption is also made by Helpman
et al. (2004), and it does not appear to be restrictive because the empirical estimates of σ by
Hummels (2001), Romalis (2007), and Broda et al. (2008) are above 3.
The free entry condition states that a sufficient mass of ex ante identical firms enters the market
so that the expected profit from entry equals the fixed cost of entry, as depicted in equation (5),
where J(s˜) ≡ [(
∞∫
s˜
sσ−1
s˜
G(s)ds)σ−1 − 1].
J (sopen)W1f + J (sx,for)W1fx = δfeW1 (5)
The number of workers in the entry fixed-cost activity is determined by the fact that, in the
steady state, the mass of active firms does not change, so the mass of entrants should be enough to
replace the firms that experienced a negative shock and left the market, Le = δMfe[1−G(sopen)]
−1,
where M is the mass of active firms in Home. The level of employment in the per-period fixed-cost
activity is Lf = Mf , and the level of employment in the per-period export fixed-cost activity is
Lx = [1−G(sx,for)]Mfx. Thus, the labor market clearing condition is given by:
(1− u)L = Le + Lf + Lx + (1 + θ)Lv,for + Lv,inf (6)
where Lv,for = E
[
qi,d
ϕ
|πfori,d ≥ π
inf
i,d ≥ 0
]
+ E
[
qi,x
ϕ
|πforx,d ≥ 0
]
is the number of formal workers in the
variable-cost activity, Lv,inf = E
[
qi,d
ϕ
|πinfi,d ≥ π
for
i,d ≥ 0
]
is the number of informal workers in the
variable-cost activity, L is the labor force, and u is the unemployment level, which is pinned down
by equation (7) that is derived from the solution of the efficiency wage problem,
u =

 B1E
(
Wi
mi
)
W1 +B1E
(
Wi
mi
)

 (7)
where B1 ≡
[
mδ(e−1)
m−δ(e−1)
]
. Notice that u depends upon E(Wi/mi), which is the expected wage
distortion per unit of mass of active firm. Let ψ(i|s∗) be the probability distribution function of
active firms, where the firm type is given by i(ϕ,m). Thus, the employment weighted average wage
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distortion is as follows:
E
(
Wi
mi
)
=
(
Le + Lf + Lx + θLv,for
) W1
m¯M
+
∫
qd,iWi
ϕimi
ψ(i|sopen)di+
∫
qx,iWi
ϕimi
ψ(i|sx,for)di (8)
The per capita government transfer is the sum of collected payroll taxes and the expected value
of the fines, where w¯for is the average formal wage and w¯inf is the average informal wage,
tr =
twforLv,for + ηζwinfLv,inf
L
(9)
The price index faced by the Home consumer is given by equation (10), where M∗ is the mass
of active firms in Foreign that is exogenous due to the SOE assumption.
P 1−σ =
M
1−G(sopen)
∞∫
sopen
(ρs)σ−1 dG(s) +
M∗
1−G∗(s∗x,for)
∞∫
s∗
x,for
(ρs
τ
)σ−1
dG∗(s) (10)
The final equation that is required to solve for the general equilibrium states that trade flows
between Home and Foreign must be balanced. This condition is not required when dealing with
symmetric countries and symmetric tariff changes, as in Alema´n-Castilla (2006) and Davis and
Harrigan (2011). Nevertheless, it is required here because my model allows not only for asymmetric
country sizes but also for asymmetric changes in tariffs. Consequently, sales from Home to Foreign
must be equal to sales from Foreign to Home, as shown by equation (11).
M
1−G(sx,for)
∞∫
sx,for
(ρs
τ∗
)σ−1
AdG(s) =
M∗
1−G∗(s∗x,for)
∞∫
s∗
x,for
(
ρPs
τ
)σ−1
QdG∗(s). (11)
Proposition 1. The general equilibrium is characterized by the solution of the system of equations
comprised by equations (5)-(10) and the entry and export cutoff equations. This solution is unique.18
18The proofs for all Lemmas and Propositions appear in Appendix A.2.
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2.3 Comparative Statics
The comparative steady-state analysis presented here assesses the effects of changes in Home and
Foreign import tariffs on the share of informal workers and on the average formal and informal wages
in the Home country. Such outcomes are very convenient measures because they are expressed as
ratios, which simplifies the derivations considerably since the general equilibrium effects on P , Q,
and M do not affect the signs of the derivatives. First, let us evaluate the effect of tariffs on the
model’s key variablesW1 and sx,for. Next, I will discuss my theoretical model predictions regarding
industry-level informality share and average wages, and their relation with the literature.
A reduction in Home import tariffs forces a reduction in W1 to promote exports in order to
offset the increase in imports and keep the trade flows balanced. Recall that the ratio between
wages (Wi) and W1 is always constant, so in this case, a decrease in W1 causes every Home wage
to decrease proportionately and the formal-informal cutoff (χ) to change proportionately as well.
The decrease in W1 also leads to a decrease in sx,for, which is indicated by a leftward rotation of
the sx,for line in Figure 3. The free entry condition, equation (5), implies that sopen moves in the
opposite direction from sx,for. Thus, a decrease in τ increases sopen, i.e., the sopen line in Figure 3
rotates to the right.
By similar reasoning, a reduction in Foreign import tariffs (τ∗) decreases sx,for and increases
Home exports to Foreign. The trade-balanced equation implies that W1 has to increase in order to
offset the surge in exports. Since sopen moves in the opposite direction from sx,for, a decrease in
τ∗ leads to an increase in sopen. These results are formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. A decrease in Home tariffs leads to an increase in sopen as well as a reduction in W1
and sx,for. On the other hand, a decrease in Foreign tariffs leads to a reduction in sx,for, and an
increase in sopen and W1.
Effects of Tariffs on the Share of Informal Workers
The share of informal workers is defined as share ≡ LV,inf/(LV,inf + LV,for). Besides being an
informality measure widely used in the literature, it is useful for policymakers because it is a
reliable indicator of the actual size of the payroll tax base. The effect of a change in Home import
tariffs on the informal share is derived in equation (12).
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dshare
dτ
=
∂share
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ
+
∂share
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ
(12)
The decrease in the marginal cost entry cutoff induced by a reduction in the Home import tariff
leads to a loss of both formal and informal jobs for Home firms. Hence, the sign of the first term
on the right-hand side of equation (12) is indeterminate. The second term in the right-hand side
of equation (12) reflects the increase in the marginal cost export cutoff that is due to the decrease
in τ . The Home firms in the sx,for locus with Wi < χ switch from informal to formal workers in
order to gain access to foreign markets, and firms with Wi ≥ χ hire more formal workers to engage
in exporting. Since formal jobs are created and informal jobs are eliminated, the share of informal
workers decreases. Lemma 1 implies that sx,for is decreasing in τ ; as a result, the second term
of equation (12) is positive. Along these lines, the resulting sign of dshare/dτ is ambiguous not
because of the inability to sign the expressions but due to the fact that informal jobs are eliminated
and formal jobs are both created and eliminated. This ambiguity should be interpreted as an
important feature of the model, making it flexible enough to reconcile with the mixed empirical
evidence discussed earlier. In Proposition 2, I present sufficient conditions that, if met, provide a
sign for the effect of tariffs on the informality share.
Proposition 2. The effect of a reduction in the Home import tariff on the share of informal
workers in total industry employment is ambiguous.
a. If condition (S1) holds, i.e., 0 > ∂Ψ
∂ϕ
Ψ−1 > 1−σ
ϕ
, then the share of informal workers will
decrease with a reduction in τ .
b. If conditions (S2) and (S3) hold, which are 1−σ
ϕ
> f
fx
[
1 +
(
σfxτ
∗
Aρ
) 1
σ−1
]
∂Ψ
∂ϕ
Ψ−1 and Pr [W ≥ χ] >
τσ
(
f
fx
) σ
σ−1
Pr [W < χ], respectively, then the share of informal workers will increase with a reduc-
tion in τ .
Though these sufficient conditions may appear somewhat cumbersome, the intuition behind
them is transparent. In Proposition 2.a, the ambiguity concerning the sign of ∂share/∂sopen is
solved by making the number of formal jobs along the sx,for locus is larger than the number
of formal jobs along sopen. This implies |∂share/∂sx,for| > |∂L
V,for/∂sopen|, which holds under
sufficient condition (S1). Condition (S1) means that the decrease in Ψ(ϕ,W ) induced by the
increase in ϕ is smaller than the increase in the employment also generated by the increase in ϕ.
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For a given wage, these assumptions imply that the change in the formal employment of firms lying
on sx,for is larger than the change in the formal employment of firms lying on sopen.
On Proposition 2.b, we have the opposite case. Here, the ambiguity is addressed by imposing
sufficient conditions (S2)-(S3) that lead to more formal jobs being eliminated along sopen than formal
jobs created along sx,for and informal jobs eliminated along sopen and sx,for. Intuitively, conditions
(S2)-(S3) imply that the majority of small firms will hire formal workers. Thus, (S2)-(S3) leads
to a smaller initial industry-level share of informality than condition (S1). Both cases, however,
are compatible with McCaig and Pavcnik’s (2012) findings of labor reallocation. So, one possible
interpretation is that for a given payroll tax and enforcement, a tariff decrease in an economy with
an initial high informality level leads to a reduction in the informality share, whereas the same
change in an economy with a low initial informality results in an increase in informality share. In
the empirical section, I show that in the 1989–2001 Brazilian trade liberalization, the informality
share increases with a decline in the import tariffs.
In the literature, the effect of a decrease in import tariffs is also modeled in Goldberg and
Pavcnik’s (2003) partial-equilibrium model. Such tariff cut works through a decrease in the price
of the good produced, which in turn leads to a decrease in the number of formal workers while
the number of informal workers remain fixed; as a result, the share of informal workers increases.
Given McCaig and Pavcnik’s (2012) findings do not corroborate Goldberg and Pavcnik’s (2003)
result that the number of informal jobs do not vary.
The derivation of the effect of a reduction in Foreign import tariffs on the Home share of informal
workers is similar to Proposition 2. Nevertheless, as shown in equation (13), the derivative of the
informality share with respect to τ∗ includes an additional term because now τ∗ affects the share
of informal workers directly.
dshare
dτ∗
=
∂share
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ∗
+
∂share
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ∗
+
∂share
∂τ∗
(13)
Besides changing the entry and export cutoffs as discussed earlier, a decrease in the Foreign
import tariff affects the Home share of informal workers by increasing the formal employment by
current exporting firms in response to the increase in the volume exported. This is indicated by
the last term on the right-hand side of equation (13), which is positive. Hence, the same type of
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sign ambiguity seen in Proposition 2 is present here. Nonetheless, this ambiguity can be solved
by using a similar strategy to that of Proposition 2. Conditions (S2) and (S3) are not enough to
obtain an opposite sign prediction anymore due to the positive direct effect of τ∗ on the share.
Proposition 3. The effect of a reduction in the Foreign import tariff on the share of informal
workers in total industry employment is ambiguous. If sufficient condition (S1) holds, then a
reduction in τ∗ will decrease the share of informal workers in total industry employment.
This result cannot be compared directly with other models’ results because they either simply
ignored the role of τ∗ or modeled symmetric tariff changes as in Alema´n-Castilla’s (2006) theo-
retical model. Alema´n-Castilla’s (2006) model predicts that a symmetric decrease in tariffs’ effect
on the informality share is ambiguous. In my model, such symmetric tariff reduction leads to the
elimination of informal jobs and the creation and destruction of formal jobs, whereas his model
predicts the creation and destruction of both formal and informal jobs, since some firms would
switch from formal to informal workers. This different result comes from Alema´n-Castilla’s (2006)
assumption that formality leads to a productivity boost. Unfortunately, the lack of firm-level data
on payroll tax compliance prevents further scrutiny of these mechanisms.
Effects of Tariffs on the Average Formal and Informal Wages
The average formal (informal) wage is defined as the simple average of the formal (informal) work-
ers’ wage. These average wage measures not only allow us to evaluate changes in wage inequality
between average formal and informal workers but also are important and easily measurable compo-
nents of worker welfare. The effects of a reduction in the Home import tariff on the average formal
wage are presented in equation (14). The equation for the effect on the average informal wage is
analogous.
dwfor
dτ
=
(
∂wfor
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ
+
∂wfor
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ
)
dW1
dτ
(14)
According to Lemma 1, W1 decreases in τ , so the sign of the effect of τ on the average formal
wage will be determined by the sign of the expression inside the parentheses in equation (14). These
terms indicate the changes in the average wage due to the creation and elimination of jobs that pay
different wages in response to tariff-induced changes in the entry and export cutoffs. For both the
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average formal and informal wages, the resulting sign of the import tariff effect is indeterminate.
Proposition 4. The effect of a reduction in the Home import tariff on the industry-level average
formal wage is ambiguous. If the sufficient conditions (S4) and (S5) hold, where condition (S4)
∂Ψ/∂W < −σT/(TW +θ) and condition (S5) is ∂Ψ/∂ϕ < 0, a reduction in the Home import tariff
will decrease the industry-level average formal wage.
To determine the sign of equation (14), let us contrast the average formal wage with the average
wage of the formal firms that lie on the curve where the derivative is evaluated, in this case sopen
and sx,for. For the import tariff effect to be positive, the average formal wage along sopen would
need to be larger than w¯for and the average formal wage along sx,for would need to be smaller
than w¯for. Thus, a decrease in τ eliminates jobs with above-average wages and creates jobs with
below-average wages. If conditions (S4) and (S5) are satisfied, the average formal wage along sopen
will be higher than the average wage along sx,for. Unfortunately, these sufficient conditions are not
sufficient to prevent sign ambiguity concerning the effects of Home tariff changes on the average
informal wage.
The effect of a reduction in the Foreign import tariff τ∗ on the Home average formal wage
also has an ambiguous sign because the sign of the term inside the parentheses in equation (15) is
indeterminate. Notice that there is an additional term—the effect on the average formal wage due
to the change in employment of current exporters.
dwfor
dτ∗
=
(
∂wfor
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ∗
+
∂wfor
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ∗
+
∂wfor
∂τ∗
)
dW1
dτ∗
(15)
Proposition 5. The effect of a reduction in the Foreign import tariff on the industry-level average
formal wage is ambiguous. If conditions (S4) and (S5) hold, a reduction in the Foreign import
tariff will increase the industry-level average formal wage.
Similarly to Proposition 4, a positive sign for the term inside the parentheses is obtained if
conditions (S4) and (S5) hold. Given that dW1/dτ
∗ < 0, the effect of foreign tariff on the average
formal wage is negative. As was the case for the reduction in the Home import tariff, these
conditions are again insufficient to prevent sign ambiguity concerning the effects of tariff changes
on the average informal wage. Lastly, notice that conditions (S1) and (S2) are compatible with
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condition (S5). Thus, the results of Propositions 4 and 5 are compatible with both cases (a or b)
of Proposition 2.
3 Econometric Methodology
In my model, Brazil is the domestic country, while the Foreign country consists of an aggregate of
Brazil’s trade partners. Hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, Brazil’s import tariff will be called im-
port tariff, and the import tariff imposed on Brazilian exports by the Foreign country will be called
export tariff. The illegal nature of payroll tax evasion makes data collection very difficult. To the
best of my knowledge, there are no datasets containing the characteristics of employers of informal
workers according to the definition of informality used here; however, there are household sur-
veys that ask workers about their employer’s payroll tax compliance. These pooled cross-sectional
data guided the econometric specifications developed here to assess my theoretical model testable
predictions. I will first discuss the econometric specification used to assess the informality share
predictions. Next, the specifications for the predictions involving the average formal and informal
wages will be presented.
3.1 Econometric Model of Informality Share
The effects of changes in the import (τ) and export (τ∗) tariffs on the industry-level share of
informal workers are estimated by modeling the worker-level probability of having an informal job
(informal∗ijt), as depicted by equation (16). In this specification, an increase in the probability of
having an informal job is equivalent to an increase in the expected share of informal workers.
informal∗ijt = β0 + β1τjt + β2τ
∗
jt + α ∗ yeart + γ ∗ industryj +Ξ ∗ characteristicsijt + εijt (16)
where informal∗ijt is “1” if worker i is employed in industry j in year t as an informal worker
and “0” otherwise, yeart is a vector of year indicator variables, industryj is a vector of industry
indicator variables, characteristicsijt is a matrix of observable worker characteristics, and ǫijt is
the unobservable error term.19 Proposition 2.a predicts that a decrease in the import tariff will
19Equation (16) is a similar version of the two-step approach used by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Alema´n-
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decrease the share of informal workers (β1 > 0), whereas Proposition 2.b suggest the opposite sign
for β1. Proposition 3 implies that a decrease in the export tariff will reduce the informality share
(β2 > 0).
The year effects are included in the specification to control for economy-wide shocks, such as
business cycles and exchange rates. For instance, if firms employing formal workers are more likely
to reduce employment during a recession, and if, at the same time, the government raises tariffs in
response to the recession, then a spurious relationship will be found between tariffs and the share
of informal workers unless year effects are used.
Some industry-specific characteristics that are correlated with right-hand-side variables are
certainly omitted, which will lead to inconsistent estimates. One example is the ability of firms to
hide their operations from the government. It is easy for an apparel firm to hide itself since it can
be small. But it is difficult for a steel mill to hide itself because it must be large due to technological
constraints. As long as these industry characteristics remain stable over time, this problem can
be addressed by adding industry effects to the econometric specification. Once year and industry
effects are included, the identification of β1 and β2 will come from the within-industry variation of
the tariffs over time, as postulated in my theoretical model.
The workers’ observable characteristics are incorporated into equation (16) on the following
grounds. It is important to account for worker heterogeneity because industries their technologies
may have different labor skill requirements. In this case, the industry fixed effects will be corre-
lated with worker characteristics. If the latter are in the error term, then the estimates will be
inconsistent. Furthermore, worker heterogeneity can lead to worker self-selection into formal or
informal jobs provided that the benefits and costs of formality vary according to worker observable
characteristics. The characteristics used in the econometric specifications are age, age2, years of
education, gender, and region of residence.
It is important to stress that following the literature, equation (16) has no control for modifi-
cations in the payroll tax and its enforcement, which are a key determinant of informality in my
theoretical model. The payroll taxes did not change during the trade liberalization episode in Brazil
(AEPS, 2005). But, the enforcement data suggests that the number of establishments visited by
Castilla (2006), where the first step models the likelihood of having an informal job as a linear probability model that
is estimated separately for every year of the sample. In the second step, these estimated industry affiliation effects
are regressed (OLS) on trade-related measures, in addition to time and industry indicators.
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auditors has varied over the years.20
Almeida and Carneiro (2012) provided evidence that the enforcement of labor regulations (e.g.,
payroll tax) is not random. It seems to be heterogeneous over time and across Brazilian states;
hence, I added state-by-year fixed effects to equation (16).21 Another finding by Almeida and
Carneiro (2012) is that enforcement seems to be a function of non-compliance. Suppose that a
decrease in the import tariff increases informality, and reduces payroll tax revenues. In order
to raise revenues, the government increases enforcement (which is part of the error term), which
reduces informality in my model. Consequently, cuts in import tariff lead to less informality and the
OLS estimate will then be positively biased. Another possible interpretation for such endogeneity
of import tariffs is that the potential loss in payroll tax revenue may have affected the setting of the
import tariff, generating reverse causation between the share of informal workers and the import
tariff.
To address these reverse causality issues, I use the Colombian import tariff that was set during
Colombia’s trade liberalization episode (from 1984 to the mid 1990s) as an instrument for the
Brazilian import tariff.22 I match the year preceding the trade liberalization in Colombia (1984)
to the year preceding trade reform in Brazil (1989). Hence, the 1984 Colombian tariff level is
used as an instrument for the 1989 Brazilian import tariff, and so on. The correlation between
these two import tariffs derives from the fact that, prior to their trade liberalization episodes, both
the Colombian and Brazilian governments believed that their import substitution industrialization
policies (which implied high levels of trade protection) were welfare-enhancing. In addition, the
import substitution development policy was considered to be an institution, even an historical
legacy, that could not be changed easily.23 At a certain point, however, governments realize that
the gains from import substitution may not be as large as expected, and change their development
20The audited establishment series at a highly aggregate level starts in 1992, when 112,327 establishments were
visited (AEPS, 2005). The number of visits increased to 144,069 in 1994 but declined to 89,000 in 2001. The total
number of establishment series for Brazil is available at IBGE (2011) from 1996 onward. This series indicates that
the number of establishments increases monotonically every year, which causes the share of establishments audited
per year to change over time.
21I’d like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of state-by-year effects.
22Several papers have used pre-reform tariff levels interacted with macroeconomic variables as instruments for
tariff changes. The pooled cross-sectional nature of the data used here prevents the use of first difference, and
macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates are endogenous in my model, which makes these instruments invalid.
Karacaovali (2011) presents other important criticisms about this type of instrument.
23The idea that a country engaged in an import substitution development policy suddenly changes its mind toward
trade liberalization was originally developed in Karacaovali (2011).
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policies by decreasing trade protection across all industries.24 This willingness to liberalize trade
due to the change in development policy made Brazilian and Colombian tariffs to move in the same
direction (i.e., downward). Hence they exhibit a positive correlation.
The Colombian import tariff is a valid instrument for the Brazilian import tariff, I believe, for
the following reasons. First, Colombian tariffs are not affected by future Brazilian tariffs because
trade between these two countries is very small relative to the trade flows they conduct with
their other partners. Second, according to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), in the early 1980s, the
Colombian government negotiated with the World Trade Organization (WTO) to set tariffs in
order to achieve a uniform tariff of 13% across industries. Consequently, Colombian policymakers
were less able to allow informality concerns to affect the tariff reduction. Third, the pre-reform
protection patterns in Brazil and Colombia were different. As shown in Table 3, Colombia offered
more protection to the light manufacturing sector (e.g., apparel and footwear), which has a large
share of informal workers, while Brazil offered more protection to capital good industries (e.g.,
machinery and transportation equipment), which employ few informal workers. Fourth, although
Colombia engaged in a labor market reform in the mid 1990s, such reforms happened a few years
after the bulk of the tariff cuts and under a different president. Accordingly, these reforms could
not have been anticipated at the time the tariff cuts were designed and implemented. Therefore,
the possible effect of Colombia’s informality on its tariffs appears to be uncorrelated with the effect
of Brazil’s informality on Brazilian tariffs.
Three more important econometric issues merit further discussion. First, the trade balance con-
dition provides an important and subtle insight regarding regressors and instrument choice. Due
to the fixed mark-up monopolistic competition framework, the exchange rate is given by the rela-
tionship between W ∗1 and W1, and therefore is simultaneously determined with informality share.
Moreover, in my model, import penetration and import and export volumes are also simultaneously
determined with informality measures. The endogeneity of these variables has been overlooked in
much of the empirical literature, such as Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Alema´n-Castilla (2006).
The second issue is that even though equation (16) includes the workers’ observable character-
istics, this specification still does not control for the workers’ unobservable characteristics, which
24For instance, governments that adopted import substitution development policies could contrast their own eco-
nomic performance with the performance of countries such as South Korea, which adopted different development
policies.
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requires the use of panel data. The only panel data available comes from the Pesquisa Mensal de
Emprego (PME), which is used by Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011). The PME data, however,
have several shortcomings. First, not only is this survey sample small (35 times smaller than the
dataset used in this paper) but it also has a large attrition—in particular, workers with unstable
jobs (presumably informal jobs) are more likely to move away and thus not be found by the in-
terviewer. Second, in this survey, each worker is interviewed only two times, and these interviews
are one year apart from each other. This interval between interviews may be too short to allow
the observation of the effects of tariffs changes. Finally, the PME is not representative of the
whole country since it covers only a few metropolitan areas that account for approximately half
of Brazil’s GDP. This is important because trade liberalization in Brazil had a significant impact
on intra-country migration, as discussed in Kovak (2013), which implies even more attrition in the
sample.
The last issue is that some of the variation in ǫijt is likely to be common to workers in the
same industry in a given year. So, the error term can be decomposed into two components—the
industry-year shock and the idiosyncratic individual component. The former, if ignored, generates
correlation across individuals in the same industry for a given year. Assuming that the industry-
year shocks are serially uncorrelated, clustering the standard errors at the industry-year level (180
clusters) addresses such correlation across individuals and provides consistent estimates of the
standard errors. Yet, the industry-year shocks could be correlated over time. Then, as pointed out
by Bertrand et al. (2004) and Ke´zdi (2004), the standard errors estimated with industry-by-year
clusters are not reliable. Angrist and Pischke (2008, p. 318) argue that there is still no consensus
as to the best approach for addressing this problem. One solution suggested by them consists of
clustering the standard errors at the industry level. This reduces the number of clusters to 15 in
my data. Cameron et al. (2008) provide evidence that standard error estimates may not be reliable
when the number of clusters is less than 20. Thus, this proposed solution has a side effect of also
leading to bias in the estimated standard errors. The approach taken in this paper is to present
estimates that use both types of clustered errors.
Equation (16) can be estimated with sample weights as a linear probability model using OLS
and 2SLS. Nonetheless, neither estimator accounts for the dichotomous nature of the observed
dependent variable, which could lead to several econometric problems. To address this issue, I
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consider informal∗ijt as a latent variable, and define the observable variable informalijt to be “1”
if informal∗ijt > 0 and “0” otherwise, and then use Probit and IVProbit techniques to obtain
consistent estimates.
3.2 Econometric Model of Average Formal and Informal Wages
Propositions 4 and 5 imply that wages and the informality status of a worker are simultaneously
determined. To address this issue, I employ a switching regression model (Maddala, 1983), also
called a ‘Tobit type 5’ model (Amemiya, 1985). The first step is to model the employment regime
(formal or informal) selection. For this purpose, I use the equation (16), which is estimated by
IVProbit. Next, I compute the inverse Mills ratio for each worker using the predicted values of
informal∗ijt. The inverse Mills ratio is given by Λ(z) = φ(z)/Φ(z), where φ(z) is the probability
distribution function of a standard normal and Φ(z) is the cumulative distribution of a standard
normal. Finally, to control for worker self-selection, I incorporate this calculated ratio into an
augmented Mincer earnings equation for each employment regime, which also includes import and
export tariffs, and year, industry, and state-by-year effects.
The use of Mincer earnings equations is suggested by Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) findings
that the different characteristics of workers lead to different wages. In my case, worker character-
istics will affect not only the wage but also the type of labor contract, as discussed earlier. A
byproduct of my empirical strategy is that it also controls for the effect of changes in average wages
induced by skill composition of the workers. The earnings equation for formal workers and informal
workers are equations (17) and (18), respectively.
wageforijt =Γ
for
0 + Γ
for
1 τjt + Γ
for
2 τ
∗
jt + α
for ∗ yeart + γ
for ∗ industryj+
Ξfor ∗ characteristicsijt − σεv
1
Λ(− ̂informal
∗
ijt) + v1,ijt (17)
wageinfijt =Γ
inf
0 + Γ
inf
1 τjt + Γ
inf
2 τ
∗
jt + α
inf ∗ yeart + γ
inf ∗ industryj+
Ξinf ∗ characteristicsijt − σεv
2
Λ(− ̂informal
∗
ijt) + v2,ijt (18)
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The self-selection into formal or informal labor contract works through a non-zero correlation
among ǫ, v1, and v2 that, if not controlled for, can bias the estimates of the effect of tariffs on
wages. If this correlation is non-zero, then the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio will
be statistically significant.
Identification in this specification can be achieved by two strategies. The first is through the
non-linearity of the functional form of Λ. This is effective as long as there is a large variation in
̂informal
∗
ijt across observations (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 551), which is the case with the
Brazilian data used herein. The second identification strategy requires the availability of at least
one variable that matters in the regime selection equation, equation (16), and does not influence
the wage received by the worker. I believe that a variable with such characteristics is the indicator
variable if another person in the household has a formal job (otherformalijt), which is also used
by Roberts (1989) and Pratap and Quintin (2006). Notice that some formal job workplace benefits
(e.g., health insurance) may cover the other members of the household. The perceived value of a
formal job increases vis-a`-vis an informal job if this worker can opt out of such benefits since she is
already covered by another member of the household’s policy. This suggests a negative coefficient
in the selection equation. The justification comes from the fact that the worker is already covered
by such benefits, and thus paying again for the same benefit will not affect worker’s productivity,
and therefore her wage.
The marginal effect of the export tariff on the formal wage is Γ̂for2 + σ̂εv1 β̂2Λ(−
̂informal
∗
ijt)[
̂informal
∗
ijt − Λ(− ̂informal
∗
ijt)
]
and is predicted by Proposition 5 to be negative. And its effect on
the informal wage is Γ̂inf2 −σ̂εv2 β̂2Λ(
̂informal
∗
ijt)
[
̂informal
∗
ijt + Λ( ̂informal
∗
ijt)
]
. Similar marginal
effects can be calculated for the import tariff, with Proposition 4 predicting a positive effect of
import tariffs on the average formal wage.
I estimate these switching regressions using a two-step method that consists of first calculating
Λ with the predicted values from the IVProbit estimate, and then estimating equations (17) and
(18) using the observations for formal workers and informal workers, respectively. Although this
method is inefficient relative to maximum likelihood, it requires weaker distributional assumptions
and imposes a lighter computational burden (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 p. 550). Given the
concern about the possible endogeneity of the import tariff variable, both wage equations are
estimated using 2SLS and OLS. Because Λ is a generated regressor, standard errors are calculated
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by a 500-repetition bootstrap that takes into account the original sample weights when conducting
the resample.
The previous literature empirical strategy, as in Alema´n-Castilla (2006), is based upon a different
two step different strategy to examine the effect of tariffs on the formal-informal wage gap. First, the
formal-informal wage gap is obtained by means of a Mincer-type specification using an informality
status indicator variable as an exogenous regressor. The second step consists of regressing the
estimated wage gap on tariffs. Notice that such empirical strategy has a major shortcoming. It
does not generate consistent estimates of the wage gap because the informality indicator variable
is determined simultaneously with the wage, and both are also affected by tariffs that are omitted
in the first step. As a result, these formal-informal wage-gap estimates are inconsistent.
4 Data and Historical Background
In this section, I first describe the Brazilian worker-level data. Next, I present the import and
export tariff data and the aggregation procedures used. Details regarding the construction of the
variables are available in Appendix A.3.
4.1 Worker Data
The IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica (Brazilian Bureau of Geography and
Statistics) conducts an annual household survey called ‘Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic´ılios’
(PNAD), which covers the entire country, with the exception of Northern rural areas. Together
these areas account for less than 5% of the Brazilian population and have no manufacturing ac-
tivity. These surveys ask workers about their demographics, employment characteristics, and their
employers’ labor regulation compliance. PNAD was not conducted in 1994 due to a lack of funds.
In the census years of 1991 and 2000, it was not conducted either, but I use Brazilian census mi-
crodata from IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center, 2007), which contains the very
same questions as the PNAD survey. Along these lines, with the exception of 1994, I use annual
data for the 1989–2001 period.
The payroll tax compliance question has few missing observations, which account for at most
0.3% in each year of the sample. Workers have no incentive to answer incorrectly this question
because the questionnaire is confidential and cannot be used as evidence in court. More impor-
tantly, informal workers in Brazil suffer no penalty if caught by the authorities; only employers
are penalized. Finally, workers are aware of their status since a small share of the payroll tax is
deducted from their wages.
The definition of informality used in empirical work is diverse. For instance, Goldberg and
Pavcnik’s (2003) model justifies informality by the existence of firing costs. In their empirical spec-
ifications, however, workers are not classified as formal or informal according to severance payment
compliance. For Brazil, their sample includes employees and self-employed workers. They use the
non-existence of a signed labor contract as an informality indicator.25 In Alema´n-Castilla’s (2006)
theoretical model, the definition of informality is based on payroll tax compliance. Nevertheless,
his empirical work uses a different definition of informality. In addition to payroll tax compliance,
he also considers as informal workers people employed in firms with less than five workers as well
as employees of firms that do not offer health insurance, which is not required by law.
In this paper empirical investigation, I will precisely follow my theoretical model definition of
informality. Accordingly, only employees are considered, and they must be between 15 and 65 years
of age. The age cutoff is chosen to exclude those who are not eligible to pay payroll taxes due to a
lack of authorization to work, either because they are too young (the minimum age to work is 14)
or are already receiving social security benefits (i.e., older than 65).
The industry aggregation level used is dictated by the PNAD industry classification, which
consists of 15 manufacturing industries. I dropped the few observations that had missing data for
any of the worker characteristics used. In the end, a total of 775,331 observations remained in the
data set and were included in the analysis.
4.2 Tariff Data
Until the end of the 1980s, Brazil’s trade policy was driven by an import substitution development
policy and the country’s balance of payments deficits.26 The former implied different levels and
types of protection across industries, in particular high tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imported
goods that competed with similar domestic products. The latter resulted in increased tariffs across
25Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) used a different survey for Brazil: the PME. The PME has several problems that
were discussed earlier.
26Kume et al. (2003, 2008) provide a good description of Brazil’s trade policy in the 1980s and 90s.
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all industries to curb imports. In 1988, however, Brazil unilaterally decided to change its trade
policy by reducing its tariffs to a level that would still prevent imports, but it did not change
its non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as argued by Kume et al. (2003). In 1990, Brazil’s new president
drastically reduced NTBs and adopted nominal tariff reductions scheduled to start in 1990 and end
in 1994 (see Kovak, 2013). The actual decrease in tariffs was not identical across industries, and
can be seen as the difference between the maximum and the minimum import tariffs in Table 3. In
particular, the industries with the largest absolute decrease in import tariffs are apparel, textiles,
pharmaceutical, rubber products, and automobiles. Moreover, the tariff reductions did not follow
the planned schedule according to Kume et al. (2003, p. 15; 2008, p. 112). Nonetheless, the tariff
reduction had real effects on the economy, as imports of manufactured goods increased by more
than 200% and import penetration increased from 5.7% to 11.6% in the 1990–1998 period. Figure
4 shows the behavior of the average Brazilian import tariff. We can see a sharp drop in tariffs in
the early 1990s as discussed before and a slight increase in tariffs by 1995 due to the adoption of
Mercosur’s external common tariff.
The 1989–2001 Brazilian import tariff and the effective rate of protection (ERP) data come
from Kume et al. (2003).27 The instrument for import tariffs is constructed using Colombian
import tariff data at the 4-digit ISIC level for the 1984-1998 period from the Colombian National
Planning Department (DNP), which were further aggregated to my 15-industry classification using
simple averages.
Brazilian firms’ access to these foreign markets also changed during the 1989–2001 period,
for three reasons. First, the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations led the United States, Japan,
the European Union, and other developed countries to decrease the tariffs levied on several trade
partners, see Finger and Schuknecht (1999). Interestingly, Abreu (1996, p. 81) points out that
developing countries had almost no influence on the agreed tariff cuts for developed countries.
Second, starting in 1991, the Mercosur customs union almost eliminated tariffs for the majority of
goods traded among its members — namely, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Third, in
order to join the WTO during the 1990s, China decreased its import tariffs on WTO members.
The choice of Brazil’s trade partners considered here is dictated by data availability. The
partner countries used here are Argentina, China, Japan, the United States, France, Italy, Germany,
27The simple correlation coefficient between import tariffs and ERP is 0.85.
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the United Kingdom, Belgium-Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Together they
accounted for more than 60% of Brazil’s manufacturing exports during the 1989–2001 period.28 The
export tariff variable used in the estimates consists of the simple average of each trade partner’s
import tariff for each of my 15 industries.
These tariff reductions by Brazil’s trade partners can be seen as the difference between the
maximum and minimum export tariff in Table 3, and were accompanied by a 68% increase in
Brazil’s exports of manufactured goods during the 1990-1998 period. The industries with the
largest decline in export tariffs are apparel, food and tobacco, textiles, footwear, and automobiles.
Figure 5 shows the average export tariff across my 15 manufacturing industries. Notice that there is
some decrease in tariffs from 1990 to 1994, which is due to the decrease in Argentina’s import tariffs
caused by the Mercosur agreement. After 1994, we have a pronounced decline in export tariffs due
to the Uruguay round tariff cuts. By contrasting Figures 4 and 5, we can see that the changes in
import and export tariffs happened at different points in time. This highlights the importance of
breaking the symmetry of tariff changes in the theoretical model.29
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I first assess the predictions concerning the share of informal workers. Next, the
average formal and informal wage specifications are estimated. Finally, I conduct several econo-
metric robustness checks by estimating different specifications, which confirm the previous results
and rule out the possibility that pre-existing trends in the data are driving the results.
5.1 Share of informal workers
The effects of changes in export and import tariffs on the industry-level share of informal workers
are estimated using worker-level data by means of equation (16). Table 4 reports these estimates,
where the standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level. Column (1) reports the OLS
estimated tariffs coefficients for the linear probability model, which are not statistically significant.
The Probit estimated coefficients, column (2), have a negative sign for import tariff (as predicted
28Mercosur is not the major destination of Brazilian exports. In particular, by 1994, the exports to Mercosur
countries reached volumes close to the exports to the United States or the European Union.
29Once year and industry effects are accounted for, the partial correlation between the import and the export tariffs
used is 0.17.
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by Proposition 2.b) and a positive sign for export tariff (as predicted by Proposition 3), but only
the export tariff is statistically significant. The null hypothesis of both tariff coefficients being equal
to zero is rejected at the 1% level. The 2SLS estimated coefficients in column (3) show a negative
effect for the import tariff, which is statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.071), and
a positive effect for the export tariff, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Exogeneity
of the import tariff is rejected at the 5% level by the Hausman test. As discussed before, the OLS
estimate was expected to be positively biased, and this is confirmed by my estimates. The null
hypothesis that both coefficients are zero is rejected at the 1% level. These results suggest that
a 10-percentage-point decrease in import tariffs increases the expected informality share by 0.92
percentage points, while a 10-percentage-point decrease in export tariffs reduces the informality
share by 1.71 percentage points.
The excluded instrument (Colombian tariffs) is statistically significant at the 1% level in the
first-stage regression. A major concern about 2SLS estimates is the weak instrument problem that
leads to inconsistent estimates. This issue is addressed by first conducting a Kleibergen-Paap LM
test. Its null hypothesis is that the included and excluded instrument matrix does not have full rank,
and it is rejected at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.076. The next test available is the Stock-Yogo
test with a null hypothesis that the actual size of the 2SLS t-test (at the 5% level of significance)
can be greater than 10%.30 Its critical value is 16.38, and the Kleibergen-Paap rK Wald F-statistic
of 16.14 is very close to the critical value. Finally, following the procedure suggested by Stock et
al. (2002), I also estimated column (4) specification using the following weak instrument partially
robust estimators: Fuller-k, limited information maximum likelihood, and continuously updated
generalized method of moments. The rationale is that these estimators have different distributions
under weak instruments. Thus, if the excluded instrument is weak, these estimators will provide
estimates that are very different from the 2SLS estimates. Fortunately, this is not the case in my
estimations, in which estimates across those estimators are very close to the 2SLS estimates. In
sum, these results suggest that my estimates are not plagued by the weak instrument problem.
The IVProbit estimated coefficients in column (4) have the same signs of column (3) specifi-
cation, but only the export tariff is statistically significant. The null hypothesis that both tariff
30The Stock-Yogo test with the null hypothesis that the bias of the 2SLS, as a fraction of OLS bias, is greater
than 10% cannot be performed here because the critical values cannot be calculated when there is only one excluded
instrument.
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coefficients are zero is rejected at the 1% level. The marginal effects calculated at the average imply
that a ten percentage point decrease in the import tariff increases the informality share by 3.77
percentage points, while a ten percentage point decrease in export tariffs reduces the informality
share by 7 percentage points. The Wald exogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity of the import tariff.
Although not reported in Table 4, the majority of worker characteristic variables are statistically
significant, which means that workers’ characteristics do matter for their job formality status. The
otherformalijt variable is negative as expected and statistically significant in columns (1)-(4). The
specifications in columns (5) and (6) do not include the otherformalijt variable, and they provide
similar estimates for the import and export tariff coefficients.
Almeida and Carneiro (2012) suggest that the enforcement of labor regulation varies by year
and Brazilian state. To account for that, I add state-by-year fixed effects in equation (16) and re-
estimate Table 4 columns (3) and (4) specifications. The results are reported on Table 4 columns
(7) and (8). The 2SLS specification in column (7) have the same signs as columns (3)specification,
but now both import and export tariffs are statistically significant at the 10% level. the import
tariff coefficient became larger in magnitude while the export tariff decreased in magnitude. A
pattern similar to column (4) shows up in the IVProbit estimates in column (8). The remaining
test results are very similar.
In Table 5, I address the industry-year serial correlation issue by clustering the standard error
at the industry level. We can see in columns (1) and (3) that the import tariff coefficient is now
statistically significant at the 5% level in the 2SLS specification. The coefficient of the export tariff
on the 2SLS specification is significant at the 10% level when state-by-year effects are not used.
But when state-by-year effects are included in the specification, the export tariff coefficient exhibits
a p-value close to 10% which is still not statistically significant at the 10% level. Nonetheless, the
null hypothesis that both import and export tariff coefficients are zero is rejected at the 5% level.
Though not contemplated in the theoretical model, I assess the effects of intermediate inputs
on informality. To do so, I replace the import tariff by the ERP.31 The results are reported in
Table 5 columns (5) and (6), and are very similar to the results in Table 4 columns (3) and (4),
31My data has only 15 industries. This implies that an input tariff variable would be highly correlated with output
import tariffs, making it very hard to identify separately the effects of both. A solution is to employ the effective
rate of protection.
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except that in the 2SLS specification, column (5), the export tariff coefficient is now statistically
significant at the 10% level. A comparison with prior studies using Brazilian data will be presented
in the robustness subsection, where I conduct estimates using specifications that are closely related
to those previously used in the literature. Now, I turn to the predictions regarding the average
formal and informal wages.
5.2 Formal and Informal Average Wages
To assess the effects of import and export tariffs on formal average wages, I first estimate equation
(17) for formal workers and equation (18) for informal workers. The first identification case consid-
ered has the inverse Mills ratio calculated using the predicted values from the IVProbit model (as
in column (4) of Table 4 and column (4) of Table 5), which includes the otherformalijt variable, a
variable not present in the wage equations. The results for average formal and informal wage are
reported in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
In Table 6, the 2SLS estimates are presented in columns (1) and (3), where the latter specifica-
tion includes state-by-year effects. These estimates exhibit a positive import tariff coefficient and
a negative export tariff coefficient. Only the export tariff coefficient is statistically significant, but
the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero is rejected at the 5% level for both specifications.
Since the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the import tariff is not rejected at the 5% level, I also
estimate both specifications of the formal wage equation by OLS, as shown in columns (2) and (4).
Again, the estimated import tariff coefficient is positive and the export tariff coefficient is negative,
but now both are statistically significant. Using column (2) estimates, I compute the marginal ef-
fects at the average value of workers’ characteristics ( ̂informal
∗
ijt = −1.0873). The results indicate
that a percentage point decrease in the export tariff increases the formal wage by 0.32%, whereas
a percentage point decrease in the import tariff decreases the formal wage by 0.05%. In particu-
lar, the coefficients decrease in absolute value and do not change signs as ̂informal
∗
ijt approaches
zero, which further corroborates Propositions 4 and 5. In all Table 6 estimates, the inverse Mills
ratio is statistically significant, which highlights the importance of controlling for self-selection into
informal jobs when assessing the effect of tariffs on wages.
For the average informal wage, column (1) in Table 7 reports the 2SLS estimates for the spec-
ification without state-by-year effects. These results indicate that neither the import nor export
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tariffs are statistically significant. The null hypothesis that both tariff coefficients are equal to zero
cannot be rejected at the 10% level. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of the import tariff is not
rejected at the 5% level. This motivates the OLS estimates that are presented in column (2), where
both coefficients remain positive. The export tariff coefficient is still not statistically significant,
but the import tariff is now statistically significant at the 10% level. The null hypothesis that both
coefficients are equal to zero is not rejected at the 5% level.
Columns (3) and (4) report the 2SLS and OLS estimates for the specification with state-by-year
effects, respectively. For both estimators, the import tariff coefficient is positive and statistically
significant at the 10% level; however, the export tariff coefficient has the opposite sign of columns’
(1) and (2) specification. It is negative and not statistically significant. The null hypothesis of
exogeneity of import tariffs cannot be rejected either. And the null hypothesis of the joint test
of significance cannot be rejected at the 5% level for columns (3) and (4). Finally, in all Table 7
estimates, the inverse Mills ratio is again statistically significant, which underscores the importance
of controlling for self-selection into informal jobs when assessing the effect of tariffs on wages.
In the second identification case, the inverse Mills ratio is now calculated using the predicted
values of the IVProbit specifications that do not include the otherformalijt variable. So, the
identification now comes through the IVProbit’s non-linearity. I re-estimate the wage equations
(17) and (18), and present the results for the average formal and informal wages in Tables 8 and 9,
respectively. The results in Table 8 are very similar to those in Table 6, with the qualification that
the estimated coefficients in Table 8 are slightly larger in magnitude and are statistically significant
at the 5% level.
The estimates in Table 9 differ from those in Table 7. In the specifications without state-by-year
effects, columns (1) and (2), the export tariff coefficient is positive, statistically significant at the
5% level, and larger than the coefficient in Table 7 column (2), while the import tariff is negative
and statistically significant only in the OLS estimate, column (2), and at the 10% level. The null
hypothesis of exogeneity of the import tariff is not rejected at the 5% level. The specifications
with state-by-year effects, columns (3) and (4), also exhibit a positive and statistically significant
coefficient for the export tariff. The import tariff is not statistically significant and is positive in
the 2SLS specification, column (3), and negative in the OLS specification, column (4). The null
hypothesis of exogeneity of the import tariff is not rejected at the 5% level either.
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So far, my empirical results mildly support Proposition 2.b to the detriment of Proposition
2.a, and strongly corroborate the predictions of Propositions 3, 4, and 5. The theoretical model’s
predictions about the average informal wage were ambiguous. The same picture emerged from the
empirical results since they were heavily dependent upon the econometric specification used.
5.3 Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks were undertaken to investigate the sensitivity of the previous results
to a different definition of informality, the omission of the export tariff, any pre-existing trends
in the data, outliers, the construction of the export tariff variable, and the way in which worker
characteristics enter the econometric specifications.
The first robustness exercise consists of using my sample and adopting a different definition of
informality, in which an informal worker does not have a signed labor contract. The estimates are
displayed in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10, and these results are very similar to those in Table 4
for the export tariff while the import tariff coefficient was not statistically significant at the 10%
level. Furthermore, in the 2SLS specification, column (2), the null of the joint significance test
could not be rejected at the 5% level.
Because the role of exports is usually ignored in the literature (see, e.g., Goldberg and Pavcnik,
2003), I conduct a second robustness exercise in which I re-estimate the specifications in Table 4
columns (1)-(4) without the export tariff variable. The results are presented in Table 10. The
import tariff estimated coefficient is not statistically significant in all specifications. It is positive in
columns (3), (4), and (6) and negative only in the 2SLS specification, column (5), which exhibited
a coefficient that is much smaller in magnitude than the coefficient of Table 4 column (3). The
null hypothesis of exogeneity of the import tariff is not rejected for the 2SLS and the IVProbit
specifications.
The specification in column (3) of Table 10 is the closest to the empirical models used by the
other studies using Brazilian data. Column (3) results indicate no impact of tariffs on informality
share. As the endogeneity of tariffs is addressed in column (4), the coefficient’s sign switches but its
magnitude remains small. Thus, despite the differences in data construction, a plausible explanation
for why the results in Table 4 differ from the results in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Menezes-
Filho and Muendler (2011), and Bosch et al. (2007) is that they do not address the endogeneity
37
of import tariffs and omit the role of export tariffs. Moreover, according to Bosch et al. (2007)
changes in labor regulations (the 1988 Constitution) enacted before the trade liberalization that
affected equally all sectors of the economy are behind the changes in the informality. Nevertheless,
Figure 1 demonstrates that the share of informal workers in the services sector remained almost
constant over the years.
Next, in order to investigate the consequences of omitting the export tariff variable in the wage
equations (17) and (18), I calculate the inverse Mills ratio, using the IVProbit estimates in Table 10
column (6), and then estimate the wage equations. The results are presented in Table 11. Column
(1) presents the 2SLS estimate of the formal wage equation. The import tariff coefficient is negative
and statistically significant at the 5% level, which is the opposite of the results in Tables 6 and 8.
The null hypothesis of exogeneity of the import tariff is rejected at the 1% level in the Hausman
test. In the OLS estimates, column (2), the estimated coefficient for import tariff is also negative
and statistically significant. For the informal average wage, columns (3) and (4), both the 2SLS
and the OLS estimates exhibit positive and statistically significant coefficients for the import tariff,
as in Table 7 but contrary to the results in Table 9. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of the import
tariff is not rejected for column (3) specification. Hence, the export tariff omission leads to biased
estimates of the effect of import tariffs.
Third, to check for pre-existing trends that may be driving the results, I conduct a placebo-
type test that consists of replacing the 1989–2001 worker-level data with the 1981–1993 worker-level
data while still using the 1989–2001 tariff data. Then, I re-estimate the specifications from Table
4 columns (1)-(4). The results are presented in Table 12. If the results in Table 4 are driven by
pre-existing trends in the data, then the tariff coefficients in Table 12 will be statistically significant.
I found that the results do not support the hypothesis of pre-existing trends. Except for the export
tariff coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5% level in the Probit specification, column
(2); however, for all of the specifications in Table 12, the null hypothesis that both import and
export tariff coefficients are zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
The fourth robustness exercise checked whether the results were driven by outliers. To do
this, the tariff variables are replaced by log(1 + tariff), because this nonlinear and monotonic
transformation reduces the influence of large values in the estimates. The new results are very
similar to the previous estimates and thus are omitted here.
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The fifth robustness check consists of excluding Argentinean data from the export tariff con-
struction. The reason for conducting this test is that Argentina’s import tariff that is applied to
Brazilian goods may not be exogenous because the Mercosur Customs Unions internal tariffs were
negotiated among its members. To address this concern, I recalculated the export tariff variable
without Argentina’s tariffs, and then re-estimated the specifications in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. The
resulting estimates were similar and thus are omitted.
A sixth robustness check entails replacing the variables involving age and education with a set
of dummies for age ranges and education achievements in order to address the concern that non-
linearity in the returns to education and experience may affect the tariffs’ estimated coefficients.
The specifications in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 are re-estimated and the results are similar. Therefore,
they are omitted.
6 Conclusions
This paper sheds some light on the important issue of the impacts of trade liberalization on labor
markets by presenting a novel theoretical model of a small open economy in which trade policy
affects firms’ payroll tax compliance—the major determinant of whether jobs are formal or informal.
The theoretical model predicts that a decrease in the Home import tariff can increase or reduce the
Home share of informal workers depending on the initial labor market conditions, while Foreign
import tariff cuts decrease the share of informal workers. In addition, the model predicts that
a reduction in the Home import tariff decreases the average formal wage, whereas a decrease in
the Foreign import tariff increases the average formal wage. No prediction regarding the average
informal wage can be derived unless the model is fully parametrized.
Next, I assess the theoretical model testable predictions using data from the Brazilian trade
liberalization episode (1989–2001). My preferred estimates for the informality share (Table 4 column
(3)) indicate that a percentage point decrease in import tariffs increases the informality share by
0.092 percentage points. Since some of these estimates are only statistically significant at the
10% level, they provide a mild support to Proposition 2.b. A similar change in foreign import
tariffs decreases the informality share by 0.171 percentage points, which strongly corroborates
Proposition 3. In addition, when the export tariff variable is omitted, the estimates of the import
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tariff’s effect on the informality share become statistically insignificant, a result commonly found in
the literature. Another important finding of the analysis is that addressing payroll tax enforcement
makes a difference. The inclusion of state-by-year effects to account for heterogeneous enforcement
led to estimated coefficients of a larger magnitude. Furthermore, the endogeneity of the import
tariff is corroborated by the Hausman test results. These key aspects may explain the different
results obtained by previous studies.
Evaluating the estimated effect of trade policy on informality share at the average change in
import tariffs of -54 percentage points, and at the average change in export tariffs of -12 percent-
age points, leads to an expected increase in the manufacturing informality share of about three
percentage points in Brazil, which is slightly more than one-third of the observed change of 8.4
percentage points.
For the average formal wage, the results support both Propositions 4 and 5. For the average
worker, a percentage point decrease in import tariffs increases the average informal wage by 0.06%,
and decreases the average formal wage by 0.05%. A similar change in foreign import tariffs decreases
the average informal wage by 0.34%, and increases the average formal wage by 0.32%. Thus, for
the average worker, the overall effect of trade policy reforms on the average informal wage is a
0.1 percentage point decrease and on the average formal wage is a 1.15 percentage point increase,
leading to a widening of the formal-informal wage gap in Brazil. The magnitudes of these effects are
inversely related to the likelihood of having an informal job, which means that although multilateral
trade liberalization may reduce informality and increase the average wage, the benefits from trade
liberalization are not the same for all workers. Finally, I find that not controlling for self-selection
into informal jobs when estimating the effect of tariffs on wages can seriously bias the estimates.
A striking finding of this paper is that access to markets in developed countries can indeed be a
market solution for labor informality in developing countries. Thus, an important avenue for future
research is to investigate the optimal payroll tax in an open economy with endogenous compliance.
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of worker characteristics in Brazil by industry. 
 
 Share of informal workers Average informal worker characteristics Average formal worker characteristics 
Industry  Average Std. dev. Min Max Education Age Share of males Education Age Share of males 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0.288 0.027 0.242 0.344 4.10 27.03 0.92 5.97 32.45 0.88 
Metals production and processing  0.122 0.050 0.063 0.205 6.12 28.49 0.92 7.25 33.05 0.89 
Machinery, equipment and 
commercial installation  0.078 0.040 0.034 0.153 6.76 31.11 0.79 7.81 33.39 0.86 
Electrical and electronic 
equipment 0.070 0.037 0.027 0.124 7.96 26.89 0.75 8.53 31.03 0.71 
Automobile, truck and bus  0.056 0.023 0.032 0.104 6.92 31.16 0.83 7.85 33.51 0.87 
Wood sawing and wood products  0.325 0.063 0.239 0.424 5.00 27.94 0.94 5.60 31.64 0.87 
Pulp and paper production, paper 
products, printing and publishing 0.134 0.048 0.062 0.208 7.80 28.54 0.70 8.16 31.66 0.76 
Rubber products  0.071 0.037 0.012 0.153 6.37 30.01 0.76 7.11 32.56 0.85 
Chemicals and fertilizer (excludes 
petrochemicals) 0.072 0.016 0.048 0.110 5.79 30.26 0.71 7.66 33.70 0.81 
Pharmaceutical, perfumes, 
detergents and candles  0.103 0.028 0.063 0.181 8.23 30.64 0.56 9.02 32.13 0.62 
Plastics products  0.094 0.028 0.047 0.148 6.39 29.05 0.69 7.05 31.30 0.66 
Textiles 0.104 0.030 0.055 0.187 5.71 29.71 0.47 6.66 31.34 0.59 
Apparel 0.260 0.040 0.186 0.335 6.19 30.72 0.19 6.68 31.11 0.22 
Footwear and leather products 0.181 0.030 0.115 0.233 5.62 29.45 0.47 6.16 28.87 0.57 
Coffee, food, beverages, animal 
feed and tobacco  0.181 0.029 0.140 0.222 5.17 27.80 0.70 6.51 32.00 0.74 
 
Source: Brazilian PNAD data. Notes: Sample weights used. An informal worker is one whose employer does not comply with payroll taxes. The 
average characteristics of formal and informal workers are all statistically different from each other.
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Table 2 – Employment shares in Brazil, by firm employment level and formality status. 
 
 
 
Source: Brazilian 1989 and 1999 PNAD data.  
Notes: An informal worker is one whose employer does not comply with payroll taxes. The data is presented 
at the most disaggregated level available. The question about firm employment level is included in the PNAD 
survey only in selected years.  
  
 Year 
 1989 1999 
Number of 
employees 
Formal 
share 
Informal 
share 
Formal 
share 
Informal 
share 
2 0.20 0.83 0.45 1.50 
3 to 5 2.27 3.41 3.33 5.82 
6 to 10 3.21 2.05 6.17 4.19 
11 or more 82.05 5.97 69.50 9.04 
Total 87.74 12.26 79.45 20.55 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of industry-level tariffs in Brazil, Brazil Trade Partners, and Colombia 1989–2001. 
 
Industry Brazilian Import Tariff Brazil’s Trade Partners’ Imp. Tariff Colombian Import Tariff 
Code Description Average 
Std 
dev Min Max Average 
Std 
dev Min Max Average 
Std 
dev Min Max 
4 Nonmetallic mineral products  0.194 0.145 0.092 0.638 0.114 0.047 0.057 0.173 0.257 0.123 0.131 0.485 
567 Metals production and processing  0.150 0.077 0.080 0.360 0.072 0.032 0.036 0.117 0.193 0.099 0.098 0.391 
8 Machinery, equipment and 
commercial installation  0.229 0.123 0.116 0.490 0.071 0.032 0.038 0.120 0.142 0.070 0.065 0.306 
1011 Electrical and electronic equipment 0.259 0.142 0.133 0.607 0.091 0.040 0.045 0.150 0.247 0.148 0.114 0.569 
1213 Automobile, truck and bus  0.382 0.181 0.191 0.848 0.107 0.049 0.055 0.217 0.229 0.124 0.113 0.491 
14 Wood sawing and wood products  0.172 0.105 0.088 0.500 0.118 0.056 0.051 0.188 0.340 0.184 0.167 0.732 
15 Pulp and paper production, paper 
products, printing and publishing 0.174 0.125 0.083 0.595 0.072 0.032 0.034 0.115 0.263 0.129 0.128 0.468 
16 Rubber products  0.255 0.198 0.121 0.820 0.092 0.038 0.048 0.144 0.234 0.098 0.136 0.430 
1719 Chemicals and fertilizer (excludes 
petrochemicals) 0.169 0.099 0.070 0.451 0.076 0.027 0.042 0.118 0.138 0.070 0.066 0.272 
20 Pharmaceutical, perfumes, 
detergents and candles  0.186 0.179 0.046 0.723 0.098 0.049 0.045 0.172 0.218 0.110 0.106 0.397 
21 Plastics products  0.249 0.144 0.151 0.571 0.129 0.051 0.073 0.204 0.378 0.210 0.179 0.800 
22 Textiles 0.275 0.201 0.132 0.874 0.161 0.061 0.084 0.249 0.418 0.264 0.182 1.023 
23 Apparel 0.362 0.255 0.194 1.027 0.212 0.076 0.122 0.317 0.479 0.316 0.198 1.199 
24 Footwear and leather products 0.232 0.154 0.132 0.741 0.188 0.063 0.109 0.259 0.358 0.206 0.157 0.757 
2531 Coffee, food, beverages, animal 
feed and tobacco  0.213 0.131 0.123 0.658 0.267 0.071 0.169 0.341 0.286 0.126 0.137 0.455 
 
Sources: Kume (2003), and others. Note: An import tariff of 0.20 represents a 20% tariff. 
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Table 4 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the probability of a worker having an informal job. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: informal job indicator 
Independent Variables / Technique 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
IVProbit 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
IVProbit 
(7) 
2SLS 
(8) 
IVProbit 
Import tariff 0.013 -0.012 -0.092* -0.166 -0.103* -0.189 -0.129* -0.336 
 (0.033) (0.127) (0.051) (0.247) (0.053) (0.252) (0.071) (0.335) 
Export tariff 0.117 1.517*** 0.171** 1.594*** 0.166* 1.593*** 0.151* 1.466*** 
 (0.076) (0.403) (0.082) (0.429) (0.085) (0.439) (0.092) (0.449) 
Another household member has a formal job -0.069*** -0.287*** -0.069*** -0.287***   -0.067*** -0.284*** 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015)   (0.003) (0.013) 
State-by-year indicators No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 
Under identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic)   3.13*  3.13*  3.18*  
  [0.076]  [0.077]  [0.075]  
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic   16.14  16.14  16.76  
Stock-Yogo test critical value for 10% max IV size   16.38  16.38  16.38  
Endogeneity Test   4.244**  4.788**  5.83**  
  [0.039]  [0.0287]  [0.016]  
Wald Exogeneity test    0.385  0.51  1.21 
   [0.535]  [0.473]  [0.271] 
Test of both Import tariff = 0 and Export tariff = 0 1.27 14.45*** 6.23** 14.16*** 6.06** 13.45*** 4.43** 10.85*** 
 [0.284] [0.001] [0.044] [0.008] [0.048] [0.001] [0.010] [0.004] 
Estimated coefficients in the 1st stage         
Colombian tariff (excluded instrument)   0.378*** 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.380*** 0.380*** 
   (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) 
Export tariff (included instrument)   -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.195 -0.195 
   (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.160) (0.160) 
Standard errors are clustered on industry by year reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. Year and industry effects, 
worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
 
 52 
 
Table 5 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the probability of a worker having an informal job, using the effective rate of protection 
and standard levels clustered at industry level. 
 
Independent Variables / Technique 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
IVProbit 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
IVProbit 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
IVProbit 
Import tariff -0.106** -0.216 -0.129** -0.336   
 (0.051) (0.266) (0.059) (0.294)   
Export tariff 0.189* 1.677*** 0.150 1.466*** 0.152* 1.556*** 
 (0.108) (0.492) (0.121) (0.509) (0.085) (0.402) 
Effective rate of protection     -0.062* -0.111 
     (0.036) (0.165) 
State*year effects No No Yes Yes No No 
Std. error clustered on industry by year level No No No No Yes Yes 
Std. error clustered on industry level  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Observations 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 
Under identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 2.198  2.221  3.636*  
[0.138]  [0.136]  [0.057]  
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 12.28  12.748  20.427  
Stock-Yogo test critical value for 10% max IV size 16.38  16.38  16.38  
Endogeneity Test 3.542*  4.758**  3.338*  
[0.059]  [0.029]  [0.068]  
Wald Exogeneity test  0.34  1.30  0.66 
 [0.559]  [0.254]  [0.417] 
Test of both Import tariff (or ERP) = 0 and Export tariff = 0 9.78*** 12.97*** 7.99** 10.84*** 5.62* 14.96*** 
 [0.007] [0.001] [0.018] [0.004] [0.062] [0.001] 
Estimated coefficients in the 1st stage       
Colombian tariff (excluded instrument) 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107) (0.123) (0.123) 
Export tariff (included instrument) -0.044 -0.044 -0.020 -0.020 -0.376 -0.376 
 (0.197) (0.197) (0.193) (0.193) (0.486) (0.486) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, another 
household member has a formal job indicator and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
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Table 6 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the average formal wages. 
 
 
Formal Wage 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables / Technique 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
Import tariff 0.026 0.086*** 0.020 0.046** 
 (0.051) (0.020) (0.051) (0.021) 
Export tariff -0.634*** -0.663*** -0.524*** -0.538*** 
 (0.056) (0.044) (0.051) (0.042) 
Inverse mills ratio 0.618*** 0.619*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
State*year effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 640183 640183 640183 640183 
Endogeneity Test 1.635  1.443  [0.201]  [0.226]  
Test of both Import tariff = 0 and Export tariff = 0 206.68*** 223.85*** 25.00*** 16.75*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Instruments (estimated coefficient in 1st stage)     
Colombian tariff 0.372***  0.375***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
Export tariff -0.050***  -0.025***  
 (0.056)  (0.003)  
Inverse Mills ratio 0.004**  0.006***  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. 
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every equation. Another household member has a formal job indicator is included 
only in the selection equation. Sample weights used. 
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Table 7 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the average informal wages. 
 
 
Informal wage 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables / Technique 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
Import tariff 0.126 0.094* 0.373* 0.185* 
 (0.105) (0.051) (0.192) (0.096) 
Export tariff 0.055 0.076 -0.136 -0.003 
 (0.164) (0.126) (0.261) (0.236) 
Inverse mills ratio -0.199*** -0.200*** -0.226*** -0.234*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.049) (0.049) 
State*year effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 135148 135148 135148 135148 
Endogeneity Test 0.122  1.443  [0.727]  [0.230]  
Test of both Import tariff = 0 and Export tariff = 0 4.96* 6.72** 3.85 1.95 
 [0.084] [0.035] [0.146] [0.145] 
Instruments (estimated coefficient in 1st stage)     
Colombian tariff 0.417***  0.417***  
 (0.003)  (0.104)  
Export tariff 0.037***  0.054  
 (0.007)  (0.156)  
Inverse Mills ratio -0.015***  -0.028***  
  (0.002)  (0.007)  
Standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. 
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every equation. Another household member has a formal job indicator is included 
only in the selection equation. Sample weights used. 
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Table 8 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the average formal wages using non-linear identification. 
 
 
Formal Wage 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables / Technique 2SLS OLS   
Import tariff 0.125** 0.114*** 0.245*** 0.154*** 
 (0.051) (0.020) (0.050) (0.021) 
Export tariff -0.844*** -0.838*** -0.824*** -0.776*** 
 (0.056) (0.044) (0.050) (0.042) 
Inverse Mills ratio 1.328*** 1.327*** 1.408*** 1.400*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
State*year effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 640183 640183 640183 640183 
Endogeneity Test 0.054  0.110  [0.815]  [0.741]  
Test of both Import tariff = 0 and Export tariff = 0 315.80*** 356.59*** 398.34*** 356.65*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Instruments (estimated coefficient in 1st stage)     
Colombian tariff 0.372***  0.372***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
Export tariff -0.049***  -0.013***  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
Inverse Mills ratio 0.000  -0.040***  
  (0.001)  (0.000)  
Standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. 
Both selection and regime equations include year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant. Sample weights used. 
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Table 9 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the average informal wages using non-linear identification. 
 
 
Informal wage 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables / Technique 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
Import tariff -0.035 -0.088* 0.150 -0.085 
 (0.108) (0.052) (0.112) (0.057) 
Export tariff 1.357*** 1.410*** 0.776*** 1.023*** 
 (0.204) (0.149) (0.216) (0.151) 
Inverse Mills ratio -1.224*** -1.239*** -1.006*** -1.098*** 
 (0.068) (0.062) (0.062) (0.053) 
State*year effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 135148 135148 135148 135148 
Endogeneity Test 0.314  1.684  [0.575]  [0.194]  
Test of both Import tariff = 0 and Export tariff = 0 107.94*** 105.19*** 69.64*** 53.64*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Instruments (estimated coefficient in 1st stage)     
Colombian tariff 0.405***  0.389***  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
Export tariff 0.272***  0.338***  
 (0.008)  (0.008)  
Inverse Mills ratio -0.201***  -0.271***  
  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. 
Both selection and regime equations include year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant. Sample weights used. 
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Table 10 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the probability of a worker having an informal job, using an alternative definition of 
informality, and when export tariff is omitted. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
        Signed labor contract 
                  indicator         
 
                           informal job indicator                    
Independent Variables / Technique 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
IVProbit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
IVProbit 
Import tariff -0.060 0.013 0.024 0.159 -0.034 0.369 
 (0.053) (0.280) (0.034) (0.144) (0.049) (0.310) 
Export tariff 0.159* 1.434***     
 (0.087) (0.446)     
Observations 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 775331 
Under identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 3.153*    3.589*  
[0.076]    [0.058]  
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 16.16    18.42  
Stock-Yogo 10% max IV relative bias critical values 16.38    16.38  
Endogeneity Test 1.2425    1.668  
[0.265]    [0.197]  
Wald Exogeneity test  0.26    0.667 
 [0.607]    [0.414] 
Test of both Import tariff = 0 and Export tariff = 0 3.73 13.21***     
 [0.155] [0.001]     
Estimated coefficients in the 1st stage       
Colombian tariff (excluded instrument) 0.378*** 0.377***   0.372*** 0.372*** 
 [0.094] [0.094]   (0.086) (0.086) 
Export tariff (included instrument) -0.044 -0.044     
 (0.167) (0.168)     
In columns (1) and (2) the standard errors are clustered on industry by year. In columns (3)-(6), the standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, another household member has a 
formal job indicator, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
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Table 11 – Estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the average formal and informal wages, with export tariff variable excluded. 
 
 
Formal Wage Informal wage 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables / Technique 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 
Import tariff -0.198*** -0.043** 0.152** 0.155** 
 (0.039) (0.019) (0.071) (0.044) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.643*** 0.634*** -0.198*** -0.198*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 640183 640183 135148 135148 
F statistic   1,000,419  136,796 
Endogeneity Test 20.711***  0.003  [0.000]  [0.957]  
1st stage F statistic 113,768  27,294  
Instruments (estimated coefficient in 1st stage)     
Colombian tariff 0.365***  0.416***  
 (0.001)  (0.003)  
Inverse Mills ratio 0.013***  0.029***  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Standard errors are bootstrapped and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets.  
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, and a constant were included in every stage of all estimated models. Another household 
member has a formal job indicator is included only in the selection equation. Sample weights used. 
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Table 12 – Placebo estimates of the effects of trade policy changes on the probability of a worker having an informal job using 1981-1993 data. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  informal job indicator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables / Technique OLS Probit 2SLS IVProbit 
Import tariff 0.005 -0.189 0.008 0.447 
 (0.025) (0.142) (0.069) (0.478) 
Export tariff -0.025 0.621** -0.026 0.351 
 (0.049) (0.296) (0.049) (0.381) 
Observations 520737 520737 520737 520737 
Under identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
  2.95*  
  [0.086]  
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   9.19  
Stock-Yogo test critical value for 10% max IV size   16.38  
Endogeneity Test   0.001  
  [0.097]  
Wald Exogeneity test    2.296 
   [0.130] 
Test of both Import tariff = 0 and Export tariff = 0 0.13 4.78* 0.29 3.99 
 [0.879] [0.091] [0.865] [0.136] 
1st stage F statistic   23,772 23,772 
Estimated coefficients in the 1st stage     
Colombian tariff  (excluded instrument)   0.302*** 0.302*** 
   (0.100) (0.100) 
Export tariff (included instrument)   -0.012 -0.012 
   (0.171) (0.171) 
Standard errors are clustered on industry by year reported in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values reported in brackets. 
Year and industry effects, worker characteristics, another household member has a formal job indicator, and a constant were included in 
every stage of all estimated models. Sample weights used. 
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Figure 1 – Informality share in services and manufacturing in Brazil, 1984-2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PNAD data.  
Note: Dashed vertical line indicates the start of Brazil’s trade liberalization 
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Figure 2 – Wage (Wi) and expected cost of a worker (bi) under formal and informal labor contracts for 
firms that serve the Home market, the Foreign market, or both. 
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Figure 3 – Firms’ entry cutoffs, choice of labor contracts, and markets served in an open economy. 
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Figure 4 – Brazilian import tariff by industry for the 1989-2001 period. 
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Figure 5 – Export tariffs on Brazilian-made goods by industry for the 1989-2001 period. 
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Online Appendix
A.1 Efficiency Wage Problem with Government Transfers
The flow value of a non-shirker worker employed at firm i is given by equation (19). Following
Davis and Harrigan (2011), I also have to assume the parameter restriction miδ > e− 1, to ensure
the existence of a solution to the problem. This condition is satisfied as long as the likelihood of
exogenous job loss and the utility penalty of effort are small.
rV NEi =
wi
e
+
tr
P
+ δ
(
VU − V
N
Ei
)
; wi ≡
Wi
P
. (19)
Similarly, the flow value of a shirker worker employed at firm i is
rV SEi = wi +
tr
P
+ (δ +mi)
(
VU − V
S
Ei
)
.
Let’s impose the non-shirking condition, V NEi = V
S
Ei
= VEi
1
r + δ
[
wi
e
+
tr
P
+ δVU
]
=
1
r + δ +mi
[
wi +
tr
P
+ (δ +mi)VU
]
Next, I solve for rVU .
rVU =
wi
mi
[
(1− e)(r + δ) +mi
e
]
+
tr
P
Isolating wi in the previous equation leads to equation (20).
wi =
rVU
m̂i
−
tr
m̂iP
; m̂i ≡
mi − (e− 1)(r + δ)
emi
(20)
Now, let’s calculate VEi − VU ,
(r + δ +mi) [VEi − VU ] = −rVU +
Wi
P
+
tr
P
.
Plugging rVU into the above equation, I obtain
VEi − VU =
Wi
miP
[
e− 1
e
]
.
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For any two firms i and j with different i 6= j, I use equation (20) to construct the following
wage ratios,
wi
wj
=
m̂j
m̂i
=
Wi
Wj
.
Let W1 be the wage paid by the firm with monitoring ability m¯, then
Wi = W1
m̂
m̂i
> W1;
∂Wi
∂mi
= −
(e− 1)(r + δ)
m [mi − (e− 1)(r + δ)]
< 0.
Now, it is time to aggregate the firm-level variables in order to solve for the unemployment
level. Given that the wage density is common knowledge, we can calculate:
VE = E[VEi ] =
[
e− 1
eP
]
E
(
Wi
mi
)
+ VU .
The flow value of being unemployed is given by
rVU = b(VE − VU ) +
tr
P
= b
[
e− 1
eP
]
E
(
Wi
mi
)
+
tr
P
In equilibrium, unemployment inflow equals unemployment outflow, bU = δ(L−U), where b is
the unemployment escape rate. Let u ≡ U/L, then
rVU = δ
(
1− u
u
)[
e− 1
eP
]
E
(
Wi
mi
)
+
tr
P
.
Plugging rVU into the wage equation, we obtain for firm i,
Wi =
δ
m̂i
(
1− u
u
)[
e− 1
eP
]
E
(
Wi
mi
)
.
Then for the firm with monitoring ability m¯, we have
u =
 B1E
(
Wi
mi
)
W1 +B1E
(
Wi
mi
)
 , B1 ≡ [ mδ(e− 1)
m− δ(e− 1)
]
.
Notice that as in Melitz (2003) and Davis and Harrigan (2011), I also let r go to zero.
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A.2 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proposition 1. The general equilibrium is characterized by the solution of the system of equations
comprised by equations (5)-(10) and the entry and export cutoff equations. This solution is unique.
Proof. The model’s endogenous variables are sopen, sx,for, s
∗
x,for, W1, M , P , Q, E(Wi/mi), u, and
tr. The general equilibrium is described by the following equations. I define s˜(s) as a measure of
aggregate inverse marginal costs for firms with si ≥ s,
s˜(sˆ) ≡
1
1−G(sˆ)
 ∞∫
sˆ
sσ−1G(s)ds
 1σ−1 (21)
The free entry condition (FE) states that a sufficient mass of ex ante identical firms enters the
market so that the expected profit from entry equals the fixed cost of entry, and it is depicted in
equation (5), where J (s˜) ≡
(∞∫˜
s
sσ−1
s˜
G(s)ds
)σ−1
− 1

J (sopen)W1f + J (sx,for)W1fx = δfeW1 (5)
The zero profit cutoff condition requires the marginal entrant to have zero profits, i.e., the
variable profit (πv) must be equal to the per-period fixed cost of production, as depicted in equation
(22).
πvd(sopen) = σ
−1(ρPsopen)
σ−1Q = W1f (22)
Similarly, the zero cutoff profit condition for exporting states that for the marginal entrant in
the Foreign market, the variable profit from exporting must equal the fixed cost of exporting as
shown in equation (23).
πvx(sx,for) = σ
−1(ρsx,for)
σ−1A = W1fx (23)
And, the Foreign exporter zero profit cutoff for entering the Home market must equal the fixed
cost of exporting, as shown in equation (24).
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π∗,vx (s
∗
x,for) = σ
−1(ρPs∗x,for/τ)
σ−1Q = W ∗1 fx (24)
The remaining equations needed are (6)-(10). Notice that by means of recursive substitution,
the general equilibrium ends up depending only on W1 and sx,for. This is because all of the other
endogenous variables can be written as a function of these two variables. As a result, the general
equilibrium problem can be defined by equation (23) and equation (25), which is a modified version
of equation (11) as demonstrated below.
AM(W1, sx,for)
1−G(sx,for)
∞∫
sx,for
(ρs
τ∗
)σ−1
dG(s) =
Q(W1, sx,for)M
∗
1−G∗
[
s∗x,for(W1, sx,for)
] ∞∫
s∗
x,for
(
ρsP (W1, sx,for)
τ
)σ−1
dG∗(s)
(25)
This is the same approach used by Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011), and it works here
because my model is isomorphic to theirs. Therefore, the proof of equilibrium existence is similar
and is omitted here.
Lemma 1. A decrease in Home tariffs leads to an increase in sopen and a reduction in W1 and
sx,for. On the other hand, a decrease in Foreign tariffs leads to a reduction in sx,for and an increase
in sopen and W1.
Proof. A reduction in Home import tariffs (τ) affects only equation (25), i.e., the trade balance
condition. It follows that for a fixed export cutoff (sx,for), a reduction in Home import tariffs will
increase imports and force a reduction in Home wages, dW1/dτ > 0, which boosts exports.
32 So,
the trade flows remain balanced. Through equation (23), the reduction in W1 leads to a decrease
in sx,for (∂sx,for/∂τ > 0). The free entry condition, equation (5), implies that sopen moves in the
opposite direction from sx,for, so a decrease in τ leads to an increase in sopen (∂sopen/∂τ < 0).
A reduction in Foreign import tariffs (τ∗) affects equation (23), and for a fixed export cutoff
it implies that W1 has to increase, that is dW1/dτ
∗ < 0. The increase in W1 leads to a decrease
in sx,for (∂sx,for/∂τ
∗ > 0) through equation (25), which means the marginal cost export cutoff
increases. Equation (5) implies that sopen moves in the opposite direction from sx,for, so a decrease
32The fact that W1 is increasing in τ and decreasing in τ
∗ is formally proved in Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare
(2011) Lemma 1.
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in τ leads to an increase in sopen (∂sopen/∂τ
∗ < 0).
Proposition 2. The effect of a reduction in the Home import tariff on the share of informal
workers in total industry employment is ambiguous.
a. If condition (S1) holds, i.e., 0 > ∂Ψ
∂ϕ
Ψ−1 > 1−σ
ϕ
, then the share of informal workers will
decrease with a reduction in τ .
b. If conditions (S2) and (S3) hold, which are 1−σ
ϕ
> f
fx
[
1 +
(
σfxτ
∗
Aρ
) 1
σ−1
]
∂Ψ
∂ϕ
Ψ−1 and Pr [W ≥ χ] >
τσ
(
f
fx
) σ
σ−1
Pr [W < χ], respectively, then the share of informal workers will increase with a reduc-
tion in τ .
Proof. Notice that ∂share
∂sx,for
=
(
Lv,inf + Lv,for
)2 {∂Lv,inf
∂sx,for
Lv,for − ∂L
v,for
∂sx,for
Lv,inf
}
. The first term in-
side the curly brackets is positive since ∂Lv,inf/∂sx,for > 0. The second term is also positive
because ∂Lv,for/∂sx,for > 0. So,
∂share
∂sx,for
> 0. Hence, ∂share
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ
> 0.
Now, let’s examine in detail the sign of ∂share
∂sopen
=
(
Lv,inf + Lv,for
)2 {∂Lv,inf
∂sopen
Lv,for − ∂L
v,for
∂sopen
Lv,inf
}
.
The first term inside the curly brackets is positive, while ∂Lv,for/∂sopen > 0. So the resulting sign
of ∂share/∂sopen is ambiguous.
a. The strategy adopted here to find sufficient conditions for a sign is to find a term that can
dominate Lv,for∂Lv,inf/∂sopen. Thus, the sign ambiguity can be solved if
∣∣∣∂sx,for∂τ ∂Lv,for∂sx,for Lv,inf ∣∣∣ >∣∣∣∂sopen∂τ ∂Lv,for∂sopen Lv,inf ∣∣∣, which means that the number of formal jobs along the sx,for line for Wi > χ is
larger than the number of formal jobs along the sopen line. Such inequality holds if |∂sx,for/∂τ | >
|∂sopen/∂τ | and |∂L
v,for/∂sx,for| > |∂L
v,for/∂sopen|. Lemma 2 guarantees that that the former
inequality holds. The latter inequality is met if condition (S1) holds. The intuition is the following.
For a given wage, as productivity increases, the firm-level employment increases at the (σ − 1)ϕ−1
rate. So, as long as the partial derivative of Ψ with respect to productivity decreases at a slower
rate, i.e., 0 > Ψ(ϕ,W )−1 ∂Ψ(ϕ,W )
∂ϕ
> (1−σ)/ϕ, there will be more formal workers employed in firms
lying on sx,for than on sopen.
b. Sufficient conditions (S2) and (S3) are needed to ensure that
∣∣∣∂sopen∂τ ∂Lv,for∂sopen Lv,inf ∣∣∣ >∣∣∣∂sopen∂τ ∂Lv,inf∂sopen Lv,for∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ ∂share∂sx,for ∂sx,for∂τ ∣∣∣.
This implies that the number of formal jobs eliminated at the sopen curve are much larger than
the number of informal jobs lost along the sopen and the sx,for curves, and the number of formal jobs
generated along the sx,for curve. The intuition of condition (S2) is the opposite of that of condition
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(S1). Now, we need to have the partial derivative of Ψ with respect to productivity decreasing at
a faster rate than the firm-level employment. Moreover, this descent has to be very steep so that,
together with sufficient condition (S3) and Lemma 3, the change in the number of formal workers
employed in firms lying on sx,for is smaller than the change in the number of formal workers lying
on sopen. Furthermore, such change along sopen has to be larger than the L
v,for change along sx,for
plus the total change in Lv,inf . That is why condition (S3) is important, by ensuring that the
initial share of informal workers is small, the change in Lv,inf will also be small.
Proposition 3. The effect of a reduction in the Foreign import tariff on the share of informal
workers in total industry employment is ambiguous. If sufficient condition (S1) holds, then a
reduction in τ∗ will decrease the share of informal workers in total industry employment.
Proof. In comparison with Proposition 2, the derivative of the share of informal of informal workers
has an additional term which accounts for the change in formal employment by current exporters.
dshare
dτ∗
=
∂share
∂sopen
partialsopen
∂τ∗
+
∂share
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ∗
+
∂share
∂τ∗
(13)
A decrease in the Foreign import tariff leads to an expansion of formal employment by current
exporters, hence ∂share/∂τ∗ > 0. Given that ∂sopen/∂τ
∗ < 0 and ∂sx,for/∂τ
∗ > 0, the ambiguity
is similar to that which was discussed for Proposition 2. So, Lemma 2 can be applied to arrive at
|∂sx,for/∂τ
∗)| > |∂sopen/τ
∗|. Then, the rest of the proof is similar to that for Proposition 2 case a.
Notice that conditions (S2) and (S3) are not sufficient to generate the opposite prediction, as
in Proposition 2 case b, due to the additional term ∂share/∂τ∗.
Proposition 4. The effect of a reduction in the Home import tariff on the industry-level average
formal wage is ambiguous. If the sufficient conditions (S4) and (S5) hold, where condition (S4)
∂Ψ/∂W < −σT/(TW +θ) and condition (S5) is ∂Ψ/∂ϕ < 0, a reduction in the Home import tariff
will decrease the industry-level average formal wage.
Proof. Notice that the derivative of the average formal wage with respect to Home import tariff is
given by
dwfor
dτ
=
(
∂wfor
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ
+
∂wfor
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ
)
dW1
dτ
(14)
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From Lemma 1, dW1/dτ > 0. So, the sign of dw
for/dτ is given by the sign of the term inside
the parentheses, which can be determined by comparing the average formal wage with the average
wage of the formal firms lying on the curve sopen and sx,for where the derivative is evaluated. The
sign of the term inside the parentheses will be positive if the average formal wage of the firms along
sopen is larger than w
for and if the average formal wage of the firms along sx,for is smaller than
wfor. This is ensured by Lemma 2 and conditions (S4) and (S5). In particular, conditions (S4)-(S5)
guarantee that as ϕ andW increase, the joint probability still decreases faster than the employment
level. As a result, the average formal wage along sopen is larger than the average formal wage along
sx,for.
Proposition 5. The effect of a reduction in the Foreign import tariff on the industry-level average
formal wage is ambiguous. If conditions (S4) and (S5) hold, a reduction in the Foreign import
tariff will increase the industry-level average formal wage.
Proof. In comparison with Proposition 4, the derivative of the average formal wage has an additional
term that accounts for the change in the average formal wage with respect to changes in the
employment level of current exporters, ∂wfor/∂τ∗.
dwfor
dτ∗
=
(
∂wfor
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ∗
+
∂wfor
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ∗
+
∂wfor
∂τ∗
)
dW1
dτ∗
(15)
The sign of dwfor/dτ∗ is given by the opposite sign of the term inside the parentheses, since
Lemma 1 implies dW1/dτ
∗ < 0. Thus, as shown in equation (26), the term inside the curly brackets
must be positive.
sgn
[
dwfor
dτ∗
]
= −sgn[
∂twpfor
∂τ∗
− wfor
∂Lv,for
∂τ∗
+
∂twpfor
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ∗
− wfor
∂Lv,for
∂sopen
∂sopen
∂τ∗
+
∂twpfor
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ∗
− wfor
∂Lv,for
∂sx,for
∂sx,for
∂τ∗
] (26)
The reasoning behind the proof here is similar to that used in Proposition 4. As in Proposition
4, conditions (S4) and (S5) and Lemma 2 ensure that the resulting sign of the last four terms
inside the curly brackets is positive. Here, we also need to have a positive sign for the first two
71
terms. Given that ∂twpfor/∂τ∗ < 0 and ∂LV,for/∂τ∗ < 0, the first two terms in equation (26)
will be positive if the average formal wage of the exporters is smaller than the overall average
formal wage. From Proposition 4, this happens whenever conditions (S4) and (S5) hold. Thus,
dwfor/dτ∗ < 0.
A.3 Data description
A.3.1 Worker Data
The industry aggregation level used is dictated by the PNAD industry classification, which originally
consisted of 16 manufacturing industries. The petroleum refining and petrochemicals industry was
excluded from the analysis because it is composed of government-owned firms that employ a small
number of workers, and by definition always complies with tax regulations.
If a worker had multiple jobs, only the information about the main job was used. The hourly
wage was calculated as the monthly wage divided by four times the hours worked per week. The
share of informal workers in industry j in year t consists of the average of the informality indicator
weighted by the sample weights provided by the PNAD and the census.
A.3.2 Tariff Data
The 1989–2001 Brazilian import tariff and the effective rate of protection (ERP) data come from
Kume et al. (2003), and these series were originally aggregated by industry value-added at IBGE’s
Nı´vel 50 industry classification. Using industry value added as weights, I further aggregated the
data into the 15 manufacturing industries shown in Table 3.
The data on Argentina’s import tariffs on Brazilian goods for the 1991–2001 period come from
Freund et al. (2008) and are at the 4-digit ISIC level. The 3-digit ISIC level data for 1990 come
from Liftschitz (1991). I used 1990 data for 1989 because there are no data available for this
year. Then, I aggregated the data into my 15-industry classification by simple average. The U.S.
data come from Feenstra et al. (2002) at Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). The
import tariff on Brazilian goods is calculated as the ratio between import duties and customs value,
which I further aggregated to my 15-industry classification using simple average.
For the remaining countries, I used the 1974–2006 Trade, Production, and Protection (TPP)
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data at the 3-digit ISIC level from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). Each trade partner’s import tariff
is the simple average tariff rate in percentage points that must be paid for the good at the border of
the importing country by a most favored nation (tar savg mfn). I aggregated each partner’s export
tariff data by simple average into my 15-industry classification. There are no data for China for
the 1989–1991 period, so for these years I assumed the same tariff level as was in effect in 1992.
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